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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter is proper pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §78A-3-102(j). This matter has been assigned to the Court of Appeals 
from the Utah Supreme Court. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) 1 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellee 
presents the following issues pertinent to this appeal. 
Issue I: In alleging fraud, may a lender reasonably rely on a borrower's 
representation that an encumbered horse is un-encumbered even though the lender did not 
search UCC filings and the UCC filings included a financing statement for a lien on the 
horse? 
Standard of Review: Reasonable reliance is a factual "matter within the province of 
the [finder of fact]." Armed Forces Ins. Exchange v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, f 34, 70 P.3d 
35. On an appeal from a bench trial, "appellate courts may not set aside trial court's 
findings of fact 'unless clearly erroneous.' To successfully demonstrate that a factual 
finding is clearly erroneous, the appellant must marshal all the evidence in favor of the 
factual finding and show that, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial 
court's factual finding, the favorable evidence is insufficient to support the finding. 
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Moreover, in assessing whether a finding is clearly erroneous reviewing courts must give 
due regard... to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the (credibility of the witnesses.'" 
Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, f27, 54 P.3d 1119; See also Utah Rules of Civ. Pro. R. 
52(a). 
Controlling Law: Robinson v. Tripco Investments, 2000 UpT App. 200, 21 P.3d 219; 
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 307 (Utah 1983); 
Despain v. Despain. 855 P.2d 254 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Issue II: Did Keetch sufficiently marshal the evidence iiji asserting that the trial 
court erred in finding that the Timothy's testimony was credible when Mrs. Timothy 
testified that it was "always implied" that the horse, "He's a Son of a Dun/' was un-
encumbered? 
Standard of Review: On an appeal from a bench trial, "appellate courts may not set 
aside trial court's findings of fact 'unless clearly erroneous.' To successfully demonstrate 
that a factual finding is clearly erroneous, the appellant must imarshal all the evidence in 
favor of the factual finding and show that, even when viewe4 in the light most favorable 
to the trial court's factual finding, the favorable evidence is insufficient to support the 
finding. Moreover, in assessing whether a finding is clearly Erroneous, reviewing courts 
must give 'due regard... to the opportunity of the trial court t0 judge the credibility of the 
6 
witnesses."5 Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, f27, 54 P.3d 1119; 566 Utah Rules of Civ. 
Pro. R. 52(a). 
Controlling Law: Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, R. 52(a), Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 
84, 54 P.3d 1119; Armed Forces Ins. Exck v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, 70 P.3d 35; Friends 
ofMapleton Mt. Inc. v. Mapleton City, 2010 UT 11, 650 Utah Adv. Rep. 28; Jensen v. 
Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d 325. 
Issue III: May the Keetches contest an award of attorney fees on appeal when they 
failed to brief this issue? 
Standard of Review and Controlling Law: "Petitioners seeking judicial review must 
identify the legal or factual errors of the lower court or agency." Utah appellate courts 
"have consistently declined to review issues that are not adequately briefed... [I]t is 
improper to f?mak[e] blanket assertions and leav[e] the responsibility to the court to ferret 
out evidence from the record to support [them]." Ball v. Pub. Serv. Comm. (In re. Questar 
Gas Co.) 2007 UT 79, 175 P.3d 545. "[W]hether attorney fees are recoverable in an 
action is a question of law, which we review for correctness." Kealamakia, Inc. v. 
Kealamakia, 2009 UT App 148, 213 P.3d 13. 
Issue IV: Are the Timothys entitled to their attorneys fees incurred on appeal? 
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Standard of Review/ Controlling Law: Parties mus|: make a specific request for 
attorneys fees incurred on appeal. Utah R. of App. Pro. R. 34(a)(9). The Timothys are 
entitled to attorneys fees incurred on appeal on the same basis as those awarded at the 
trial court level. R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT ll,lf27,|40P.3d \\\9\ Doctors' Co. 
v. Drezga, 2009 UT 60,1J32, 218 P.3d 598. 
Issue V: Are the trial court's alleged errors harmless because they will not change 
the outcome of the case? 
Standard of Review/ Controlling Law: No error in either tfre admission or the exclusion 
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or ih anything done or omitted 
by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a|new trial or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stagelof the proceeding must 
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights 
of the parties. Utah R. of Civ. Pr. R. 61. Errors we label "harmless" are errors which, 
although properly preserved below and presented on appeal, are sufficiently 
inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected 
the outcome of the proceedings. State v. Verde, 110 P.2d 11$, 120 (Utah 1989); Armed 
Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, f 22, 70 P.3d 35. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, R. 52(a): "...Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses..." See Addendum, Exh. "A". 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, R. 24: "...The argument shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including 
the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding 
must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party 
seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and 
set forth the legal basis for such an award." See Addendum, Exh. "B" 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, R. 61: "No error in either the admission or the exclusion 
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted 
by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must 
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights 
of the parties." Utah R. Civ. P. R. 61. See Addendum, Exh. "C" 
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11 U.S.C. 523(a): "...discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228 (a), 1228 (b), or 1328 (b) 
of this title does not discharge an individual debtor...." See Addendum Exh. "D" 
STATEMENT OF THE CASt 
Under Utah Rules of Appell. Pro. R. 24(b)(1), Lender is satisfied with Borrower's 
statement of the case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Underlying Findings of Fact 
In the summer of 2000, Defendant/Appellants Thomas and Teri Keetch (the 
"Keetches") "borrowed $102,000 from MSF Properties and gave MSF Properties a lien 
on a horse named Hesa Son of a Dun" (the "Horse"). The payoff on that note was in 
excess of $123,000 as of September 21, 2001. (R. 1022) 
In August or early September 2000, Teri Keetch and Thomas Keetch contacted 
Paul and Janice Timothy (the "Timothy's), through Rebecca Mendenhall, and asked Paul 
and Janice Timothy for a loan. (R. 1022) 
Teri Keetch met with Paul Timothy at the McDonald's in Lehi, Utah. At that 
meeting, "Paul Timothy was acting on his own behalf and also as the agent for his wife in 
investigating the terms and conditions of the loan. At that meeting, Teri Keetch solicited 
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a loan from Paul and Janice Timothy. The loan amount was to be $83,500." (R. 1022) 
"Teri Keetch told Paul Timothy that she had a horse named Hesa Son of a Dun that she 
could use as collateral to secure the loan." (R. 1021) After the meeting, "Teri Keetch 
showed Paul Timothy the horse named Hesa Son of a Dun. Teri Keetch told Paul 
Timothy that she owned the horse and that the horse was worth between $125,000 and 
$175,000. By stating that she owned Hesa Son of a Dun and by offering to pledge the 
horse as collateral and by stating the value of the horse, Teri Keetch asserted that she 
owned the horse and that it was hers to pledge and that she held enough equity in the 
horse to secure the loan she wanted from Paul and Janice Timothy." (R. 1021). That 
assertion was false because she had previously agreed to place a lien on Hesa Son of a 
Dun in the amount of $123,000. If "Hesa Son of a Dun was worth only $125,000 Teri 
Keetch held only $2,000 in equity in the horse. If Hesa Son of a Dun was worth $175,000 
she had only $77,000 in equity in the horse. In either case, her equity in the horse was a 
lower figure than the amount of the loan she was soliciting from Paul Timothy." (R. 
1020-1021). 
"At the meeting at McDonalds, Paul Timothy specifically asked Teri Keetch if the 
Keetches owned Hesa Son of a Dun free and clear and Teri Keetch replied that she and 
her husband owned the horse free and clear. That representation was false." (R. 1021). 
At the meeting at McDonald's, "Teri Keetch told Paul Timothy that she needed the 
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loan in the amount of $83,500 in order to help her get her business started. Based upon 
the fact that only a small portion of the loan went for business purposes/' the trial court 
was "persuaded that Teri Keetch's assertion as to the purpose of the loan was false." (R. 
1021). 
Following that meeting, "Paul Timothy took several steps to determine whether he 
and Janice should loan the money to Thomas and Teri Keetch. Some of the steps he took 
were: 
a. Paul Timothy spoke with Jake Stephens regarding the value of Hesa Son of 
a Dun, the income potential of the horse and whether Jake Stephens was 
aware of any lienholders on the horse; 
b. Paul Timothy called the American Quarter Horse Association and 
determined that according to their records, Thomas and Teri Keetch owned 
Hesa Son of a Dun and that the AQHA showed no liens on the horse." 
(R. 1020). 
"Mr. Timothy testified that he was not familiar with the UCC filing system and did 
not know that it was possible to search the UCC filing system to determine whether a 
horse was owned free and clear. This testimony was consistent with Mr. Timothy's 
experience. Mr. Timothy owned several horses and was familiar with the AQHA and the 
fact that the AQHA registered owners and even liens. In his experience with horses, he 
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had never heard of a UCC filing on a horse." (R. 1021). 
On "September 28, 2001, Paul Timothy and Thomas Keetch met at the office of 
Rebecca Mendenhall. During that meeting, Paul Timothy asked Thomas Keetch several 
questions. Thomas Keetch gave false answers to those questions. Specifically: 
a. Paul Timothy asked Thomas Keetch the purpose for the loan. Thomas 
Keetch informed him that Thomas and Teri Keetch needed exactly $83,500 
for business purposes. Within a day or two, Thomas Keetch had used some 
of the money to purchase new tires for his personal vehicle, to register his 
personal vehicle, to pay the mortgage on a rental property, to pay his 
personal mortgage and to make somewhere between $15,000 and $30,000 
in payments to Carol Brown. The court was persuaded by clear and 
convincing evidence that when Thomas Keetch told Paul Timothy, on 
September 28, 2001, that he needed the precise sum of $83,500 for business 
purposes, Thomas Keetch was not being truthful. 
b. Paul Timothy asked Thomas Keetch if Hesa Son of a Dun was owned free 
and clear. Thomas Keetch replied that the horse was owned by Thomas and 
Teri Keetch free and clear. That statement was false." 
(R. 1020-1018). 
"On September 28, 2001, Paul Timothy, Janice Timothy, Thomas Keetch and Teri 
13 
Keetch all signed a promissory note." (R. 1018). The promissory note stated that "Hesa 
Son of a Dun would be offered as collateral on the loan and Thomas and Teri Keetch 
agreed not to move the horse until the loan was paid off. By agreeing to a contract with 
that term, Thomas and Teri Keetch represented to Paul and Janice Timothy that they 
owned Hesa a Son of a Dun, that they were free to offer the horse as collateral and that 
they had enough equity in the horse to secure the principal balance of the promissory 
note.1 Those representations were false." (R. 1018). 
"Thomas and Teri Keetch entered into a plea in abeyance agreement in which they 
plead no contest to criminal charges arising from their actions in this matter." (R. 1017) 
As part of the plea in abeyance agreement, they were required to pay $60,000 in 
restitution to Paul and Janice Timothy. Thomas and Teri Keetch paid $63,677.93 to Paul 
and Janice Timothy as a result of the restitution order in the criminal case. (R. 1017). 
The Horse "was seized by MSF Properties in October 2001 and was therefore 
unavailable as collateral to secure this loan or to pay Paul or Janice Timothy. (R. 1017). 
Skips Suzy Bars, and her unborn foal, were never delivered to Paul and Janice Timothy." 
(R. 1017). 
No other payments were made on the note. (R. 1017). 
1
 The promissory note also promised a mare (Skips Suzy Bars) as collateral and the 
unborn foal of Skips Suzy Bars as collateral. The evidence at trial showed that these horses were 
of very little value and that Hesa a Son of a Dun constituted the vast majority of value offered as 
collateral. 
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Procedural Background 
Paul and Janice Timothy filed an amended complaint on or around July 11, 2002. 
(R. 59). In the amended complaint they alleged several causes of action, including breach 
of contract and fraud. 
After the complaint was filed but before trial, both Thomas and Teri Keetch 
declared bankrptcy in Arizona. The Arizona Bankruptcy court ordered that a trial be held 
in Fourth District Court in the State of Utah. (R. 897) 
The parties conducted a trial of this matter in the Fourth District Court, Judge 
Laycock's courtroom on January 8th, 9th and 13th of 2009. (R: 925, 935 & 941). After 
hearing the evidence the court issued a decision and provided the parties with its 
Finding's of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment." (R: 1027). 
The Timothys then moved for summary judgment in the bankruptcy court. The 
Keetches opposed that motion. In opposing the motion, the Keetches filed a brief that is 
substantially similar to the brief they have filed on appeal. Addendum, Exh "E". After 
considering the arguments of the parties, the bankruptcy court found in favor of the 
Timothys, entering judgment in against the Keetches and finding that the debt was not 
dischargeable. Addendum, Exh. "F". 
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Findings of the Trial Court Regarding 
Misrepresentation, False Pretenses and Reasonable Reliance 
The trial court found in favor of Paul and Janice Timothy on the issue of breach of 
contract (R. 1017-1013). The court made the following statement in regards to the 
Keetch's misrepresentations regarding Plaintiffs breach of contract: "[t]hese false 
statements do show that Thomas and Teri Keetch obtained the loan under false 
pretenses." (R. 1009). The judgment also found in favor of Paul and Janice Timothy on 
the issue of fraud, but only to the extent that Thomas and Teri Keetch had made a 
misrepresentation regarding the issue of whether Hesa Son of a Dun was owned free and 
clear at the time of the Timothy loan or whether Hesa Son of a Dun had a lien on him. 
(R. 1013-1010). Notably, the court also noted that the "...damages awarded to the 
plaintiffs under the cause of action for fraud are identical to the damages awarded to the 
plaintiffs under their breach of contract." (R. 1011). 
The trial court made the following findings on the issue of reasonable reliance: 
47. Paul and Janice Timothy were reasonable in relying upon the 
misrepresentation. Paul and Janice timothy acted reasonably because Paul 
Timothy specifically checked with the horse's trainer, Jake Stephens and was 
informed that Thomas and Teri Keetch owned Hesa Son of Dun and was informed 
that Jake Stephens was unaware of any lien on the horse. Paul Timothy also called 
the American Quarter Horse Association2 and was told that the AQHA had no 
2
 The AQHA is somewhat similar to the American Kennel Club. The AQHA maintains 
ownership, lien and breeding records for quarter horses. If a quarter horse is not registered with 
the AQHA it's fair market value is reduced. (T:387:13-25). 
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record of any lien on Hesa Son of a Dun. Paul Timothy also asked both Thomas 
and Teri Keetch and was informed by both of them that they owned Hesa Son of a 
Dun free and clear of all liens. 
48. Thomas and Teri Keetch argued at trial that Paul and Janice Timothy were not 
reasonable because they failed to discover a UCC filing showing a lien on Hesa 
Son of a Dun. Paul and Janice Timothy testified that they were not familiar with 
the UCC filing system and did not know that they should check that system. The 
law of the state of Utah does not require a victim of misrepresentation to inspect 
the public record to verify the truthfulness of the statement made by the defendant. 
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 307 (Utah 1983). 
In Robinson v. Tripco, 2000 UT App 200, the Appellate Court analyzed the 
doctrine of reasonable reliance. The court quoted Conder v. A.L. Williams & 
Assocs. 739 P.2d 634, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) for the assertion that "a plaintiff 
may justifiably rely on positive assertions of fact without independent 
investigation. It is only where, under the circumstances, the facts should make it 
apparent to one of his knowledge and intelligence, or he has discovered something 
which should serve as a warning that he is being deceived, that a plaintiff is 
required to make his own investigation." In applying the reasoning of both Tripco 
and Conder, this court concludes that Paul and Janice Timothy were justified in 
not doing a UCC search. Both Thomas and Teri Keetch represented to Paul 
Timothy (and Janice through him) that Hesa Son of a Dun was not encumbered. 
There were no red flags that arose during the Timothy's investigation that should 
have alerted them to the fact that the representation was false. Therefore, Paul and 
Janice Timothy were not required to investigate the truthfulness of the 
representation. 
(R:1011-1012). 
The Court found the Timothys credible on these points, viewing the small 
discrepancies in their testimony as less material because their "memories have faded to 
some extent55 (R: 1023). 
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The Court's Findings Re: Credibility of the Witnesses: 
The Court found that Thomas and Teri Keetch were not credible witnesses. In 
regards to Thomas Keetch, it stated, "[d]uring his testimony, Thomas Keetch appeared to 
attempt to be as evasive as possible. It appeared that he was working hard to be vague. 
Thomas Keetch also testified differently during trial than he did during his deposition. 
Based upon these contradictions, his demeanor during trial and other false statements (as 
will be explained below) this court concludes that Thomas Keetch was not a trustworthy 
witness." (R: 1026). The court specifically found that Thomas Keetch informed Paul 
Timothy that he needed $83,500.00 to start a business and that he used loan proceeds for 
non-business purposes. (R: 1018, 1019). Based on the evidence at trial, the Court, as 
noted above, also found that Thomas Keetch's representations about encumbrances on the 
Horse, the purpose of the loan, and the bankruptcy were fals^. 
In regards to Teri Keetch, the court found that she changed her testimony with 
regards to the seizure of Hesa Son of a Dun. (R: 1025). The Court found that Teri was 
not credible when Teri testified that she and Thomas Keetch paid off the MSF loans. 
(R: 1025). The court found that Teri was dishonest on her bankruptcy filing. Id. The 
court also stated that Teri Keetch was not a credible witness in regards to the loan and the 
purpose of the loan. (R: 1021). In sum, the court noted that Teri Keetch had 
misrepresented her plan to start a "horse therapy" business, had misrepresented the exact 
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sum of money she needed on the loan, and had misrepresented facts about her bankruptcy 
history. (R: 1010). These findings are supported by the evidence from trial as indicated 
below: 
a. The Inconsistent Testimony of Thomas Keetch: 
Thomas Keetch testified that he was "not for sure" if he used the loan proceeds to 
meet payments on his home. (T: 25: 15-17). He went on to say that he did use the loan 
proceeds to pay off his mortgage. (T: 26: 8-11). He also stated that he didn't know if he 
paid $10,000 from the loan proceeds towards rental property (T:28: 11-14). He corrected 
this testimony by stating that he had paid $10,000 towards the rental property. (T:29: 2) 
(emphasis added). He also stated that he didn't feel that telling the court where the loan 
proceeds went was "relevant." (T:29: 4-6). He also testified that he "didn't know" if he 
had paid $15,000 to Carol Brown. (T:30: 2). Then he testified that he "thought it was 
ten." (T:30: 4). Then he admitted that in his deposition he had, in fact, testified that he 
paid "$15,000 to Carol Brown, his mother in law. (T:30: 8-10). Then he testified that he 
"possibly" used the loan proceeds to register his car. (T:33: 2-4). He went on to state that 
he paid $5,000 in earnest money to a real estate broker. Id at 11-14 . He then stated that 
he had used the loan proceeds to purchase new tires on his personal vehicle but that this 
expenditure was business related because it would help him set up a "therapeutic ranch". 
(T: 34: 3-12). 
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He also stated that he had paid the Timothy's over $70,000 in restitution for 
payment on a note. (T: 38: 1-4). He then stated that he didn't know if he had paid that 
amount. (T: 41: 24-25; 42: 1-7). He testified that he "had nothing to do..." with 
arranging for the loan. (T: 47: 15-25). He testified that he signed the promissory note 
and the court admitted copies of the signed note into evidence (T: 34: 13-24). Then he 
testified that he entered into the initial loan with MSF Properties (T: 51: 20-24). He 
testified that the horse was "worth $125,000 to $175,000," but that he only listed the 
horses value at $50,000 on his bankruptcy petition. (T: 58: 15-17; 60: 17-20). He later 
stated this represented his equity in the horse, but then changed that to the horse's "fire 
sale value." (T: 88: 15-18). He also testified that he "put down an inaccurate amount of 
monthly income" on his bankruptcy petition. (T: 62: 11-13). Timothy Keetch testified 
that "...I never talked to the Timothys. I never said anything to them.yy (44: 23-24) 
(emphasis added). He later testified that he did meet both Paul and Janice Timothy at the 
offices of Becky Mendenhall. (T: 72: 14-17). Additionally Jake Stephens testified that 
Thomas and Teri Keetch were present when Paul Timothy came to look at He's a Son of 
a Dun. (T: 176: 12-23). 
b. The Inconsistent Testimony of Teri Keetch 
Teri testified that she did not tell "Paul and Janice Timothy that" she "owned" a 
horse named "Skip (Suzy) Bars" when she entered a loan agreement with them. (T: 98: 
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11-17). When presented with contrary statements from her deposition, she then stated 
that her deposition was "inaccurate" because she had not made that statement to the 
Timothy's, but "...was referring to Becky." (T: 98: 5-9). Teri testified that she did not 
disclose to the Timothy's that she was involved in a bankruptcy proceeding and that 
"He's a Son of a Dun had been previously collateralized." (T: 105:24-25; 106: 1). In 
fact, Paul Timothy testified that Teri Keetch told him that "she and her husband owned 
the stallion free and clear." (T: 377: 14-15). Paul Timothy's testimony reveals that she 
was lying: 
A. as a follow-up question I said, Is the stallion encumbered in any way? And 
she said not. I asked her if the stallion was fully paid off. And she said he 
was. (T: 377: 21-23). 
Later, Mr Timothy testified as follows: "I asked her, once again, if the stallion was 
encumbered. I also asked her if she had ever declared bankruptcy, and she told me she 
had not. I said, have you or your husband or together have you ever declared bankruptcy? 
And she indicated that she had never done that." (T: 377: 25; 378: 1-4). Janice was 
present at the September 28131, 2001 meeting, but she did not personally discuss the 
bankruptcy with Thomas Keetch. (T: 281:23-282:1). 
Teri Keetch also testified that she never told the Timothys the estimated value of 
"He's a Son of Dun". She went on to testify that she did not tell "...Paul Timothy that 
[she] needed the money from this loan so that [she] could buy some therapy horses..." (T: 
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I l l : 14-17) (parenthetical added for clarity). Later, she testified, "...[t]he only discussion 
that Mr. Timothy and I had at McDonald's was he asked me briefly about the nonprofit, 
and so I may have told him in that, that we would be purchasing therapy horses for that 
business." (T: 113: 5-10)(emphasis added). This is different than testimony she gave on 
the third day of trial when she stated, "I don't recall discussing any mares with him at 
McDonald's" (T: 482: 12-13). Later, Teri Keetch also testified that, in fact, the purpose 
of the loan was not "...to help save some horses." (T: 117: 16-19). On the third day of 
trial she also offered the following testimony regarding the McDonald's conversation. 
Q. And your answer in your deposition was, "And I probably did say 
something like, you know, we are trying to get the nonprofit organization 
and we need to purchase the therapy horses." 
A. Correct. And I believe I said earlier in testimony that I don't recall 
discussing my mares at all. We may have - he may have - we did talk 
about the nonprofit organization, as I said in my testimony earlier, and if we 
did it would have been, but, ultimately, that is our goal is to purchase 
therapy horses. We can't have a therapy ranch without therapy horses. 
Q. Okay. I had asked you in your deposition, page 157, line 10, "All right. 
And isn't it true that that is probably a little bit misleading to the Timothys 
in that they thought that the money would be used to purchase those 
horses?" And your answer was? 
A. "Yeah, if that's what they thought, that is misleading." 
(T: 483: 3-20). 
In fact, Paul Timothy stated that he was led to believe his loan was being used to 
purchase horses when he testified, "She indicated that's the amount she needed to 'save 
herherd.'"T:376: 14-15). 
Teri Keetch also testified that she did not disclose the "bankruptcy" or that she 
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"owed money to MSF Properties," and that she had "secured that loan with He's a Son of 
Dun..." (T: 118: 17-25). Teri also testified differently then Thomas regarding her 
signatures on some of the loan documents: 
Q. Your husband, Tom, testified that you did sign it. Was he not being 
accurate in his testimony when he testified that you signed it? 
A. Yeah, I don't know if he remembers accurately, But, no, that's not my 
signature. 
(T: 123:20-24). 
She also testified differently than she did in her deposition as was pointed out: 
A. Well, he called me at work to see if he could bring this back to my work for 
me to sign it, and I told him that I didn't - 1 had already used my break and 
I didn't have a break, and Becky asked if he could sign it for me, and I said 
I have no problem with that if that's allowed, if that's okay. And she said, 
Yeah, if he has your permission. And so I said Yeah, you can. (T: 124) 
Later, she testified regarding her deposition as follows: 
Q. On line No. 8 I asked you the question, "Okay. Are you aware, were you 
aware at the time that somebody was signing your name on this?" And your 
answer to that was? 
A. "No, not on that day, no." 
(T: 125:25-126: 1-3). 
Later, she testified that she had not paid $20,000 to $30,000 of the loan proceeds 
directly to her mother (T: 136: 21-23). But, later she stated that in deposition she had 
paid "either $20,000 or $35,000ff to her Mom. (T: 137: 1-6). She also testified that she 
had no interest in Keetch Ranch when she stated: 
Q. And you have testified previously under oath that you have no managerial 
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interest in Keetch Ranch, Inc., correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you have testified previously under oath that you are not an employee 
of Keetch Ranch, Inc., correct? 
A. Correct (T: 145: 17-22). 
Despite this, her brother, Kelli Crestani testified about the ranch as follows: 
Q. Did she tell you it (the Keetch Ranch) was her business? 
A. Yes. 
(T: 204: 14-15)(parenthetical added for clarity) 
Kelli Crestani, Teri's own brother, also testified that he thought Teri Keetch lied in 
her deposition. (T: 208: 11-12). Finally, her testimony differed significantly from Jake 
Stephen's. He stated in his testimony as follows: 
...I went up to the police officer and said, What's going on? This is my place. 
And they just said, We have the paperwork, or whatever, to repossess this horse. 
And so I don't know anything about paperwork, but I looked it over and I asked 
the cop, Can he do this? And he said, he has the right stuff, you know. 
And so I went and called Teri, and I said, Hey, I don't know what the deal is here, 
but there is some people here to pick up this horse. And she said, Well, call the 
cops and say that it is stolen. And I said, Well, I don't know these people, but 
there is a cop here already, and they say they have the paperwork to take it. And 
she said, Well, tell them they are trying to steal it. And I said, I don't know how 
this works, but I said, There is a cop here already. I can't tell them it's stolen, you 
know. (T: 181: 1-15). 
In regards to the seizure, Teri Keetch stated, "Jake called me after He's a Son of a 
Dun was already gone, so / wasn't even aware that it was taking place." (T: 158:9-10) 
(emphasis added). Jake Stephens also testified that he had "heard some things" about 
Teri Keetch being dishonest. (T: 184: 11-12). Mr Stephen's went onto say that Teri 
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Keetch had a reputation as a "habitual liar" in the community. (T: 184: 13). Moreover, 
Jake Stephens testified that she had given him a check even though the checking account 
to be drawn against was already closed. (T: 183: 11-12). 
c. The Events Re-counted by Paul and Janice Timothy: 
Paul Timothy testified that after meeting Teri Keetch at McDonalds, he "...called 
the American Quarter Horse Association and asked them if there were any liens on He's a 
Son of a Dun or any of the mares that she had in her brood there. (T: 381: 9-12). 
Additionally, Paul Timothy explained: 
[0]ur house was pretty well paid off. We were taking a second mortgage on the 
house. I was nearing retirement, and certainly couldn't afford to give up 
$83,500.00 if she couldn't pay the loan back. She assured me there would be no 
problem. 
Q. Okay. So you decided to make a loan to the Keetches. Where did you 
come up with the money to do that? 
A. We took out a second on the house. (T:383: 1-7). 
Additionally, Paul Timothy testified as follows regarding his conversation with 
Teri Keetch: "I asked him if the stallion was free and clear. He indicated that she was. I 
said, '[T]om, are there any encumbrances on this stallion at all?' He said none. I asked 
him if it was fully paid off? He assured me it was." (T:385: 6-9). Janice corroborated 
this testimony stating that it had always been "implied" that there was no encumbrances 
and that the Keetches had not disclosed any encumbrances on September 28th, 2001. (T: 
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280: 11-23). To investigate the issue, the Timothys asked the trainer of the horse who 
also said he was not aware of any lien on the horse. (T: 380: 8-16). He also contacted the 
American Quarter Horse Association ("AQHA") and inquired whether the Horse had any 
liens. (T: 381: 8-18) 
Paul Timothy also testified about the use of the loan proceeds: "Incidentally, I 
asked Teri and I asked Tom, I said, Is any of this money going for anything else other 
than these brood mares? They assured me that that was not the case." (T: 390: 1-5). 
Janice Timothy agreed with this testimony when she testified that she understood the 
Keetches would use the money for their Mares only. (T: 272t 17-25) 
Paul Timothy also testified as follows regarding the UCC filing: 
Q. There was some talk about a UCC filing. Had you ever seen a UCC filing.? 
A. I had no idea what it was. (T: 390: 20-22). 
The Court noted that "[i]t never occurred to me (Judge Laycock) that you could do 
a UCC filing on a living animal." (T: 561: 6-7) (parenthetical added). 
Later Paul Timothy testified that He's a Son of a Dun was seized by the other 
creditor. (T:393: 15-18). This left the Timothy's with "no recourse" to re-collect their 
money. (T: 394: 15-16). When Paul Timothy presented this unfortunate situation to Teri 
Keetch she just "smiled like she always does." (T: 397: 24). 
d. The Court Concluded that the Keetches are not credible. 
The court made the following findings at trial, prior to entering the Findings of 
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Fact Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment. The Court stated, 
...my very specific impression of Mr. Keetch was that he was attempting to be as 
evasive as possible...his answers were vague. He didn't remember. He didn't 
want to make a commitment very often to anything. And on the whole, in the end, 
when it comes down to critical elements of his testimony to the issues that are 
really critical to my decision, I don't find that he is a trustworthy reporter of facts, 
because he was doing his best not to do anything that could possibly help the 
plaintiffs, and in the process he hurt himself. (T: 546: 19-25; 547: 1-3) 
..When it comes to Mrs. Keetch, there are times in her testimony when I thought 
she said things that were just totally unbelievable. (T: 547: 16-17). 
The court did note that there were conflicts with the Timothy's testimony, 
however, it found these conflicts less "material". (T: 551: 4). This was just after the 
court noted that "I'm very cognizant of the fact that this is over seven years ago, and that 
everybody's memories can be very vague at this point..." (T: 547: 10-11). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) 1 Appellee has submitted its own statement of the issues. 
The Keetches' first and second issue state: 
Does a UCC filing which gives notice that a horse is collateral for an existing loan 
provide constructive notice, which precludes a party who failed to search the UCC 
records from asserting a claim for fraud (ie. reasonable reliance) based upon a 
claim that the defendants misrepresented to them that the horse was encumbered? 
Are plaintiffs precluded from asserting fraud who underwent an investigation of 
whether the horse was the subject of a lien or collateral for an existing loan, 
however, as part of their investigation failed to search UCC filings? Appellant's 
Brief, p. 4. 
The Timothys believe these two issues are best articulated as the single, following issue: 
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In alleging fraud, may a lender reasonably rely on a borrower's representation that 
an encumbered horse is un-encumbered even though the lender did not search 
UCC filings and the UCC filings included a financing statement for a lien on the 
horse? 
The Keetches have argued that the Timothys had access to the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code ("UCC") filings. Because of this access, the Timothys should have 
known that a third party had placed a lien on the Keetch's horse even after the Keetches 
told the Timothys that the horse was unencumbered. The UCC provides notice to lenders 
who wish to secure their loans with livestock. It also provides an ordered way to resolve 
priority disputes between lenders who have secured loans on the same livestock. 
However, there is no legal support for the suggestion that a UCC filing eliminates a 
lender's cause of action for fraud. As an element of fraud, reasonable reliance is not 
eliminated simply because a UCC filing contradicts the misrepresentation that the 
Timothy's relied on. Alleging reasonable reliance does not generally impart a duty to 
conduct an investigation as to whether a representation was fraudulent. This is true unless 
something placed a person of reasonable intelligence on notice of the fraud. People of 
reasonable intelligence don't know about the intricacies of UCC financing statements for 
horse liens. The Timothys did not know about the UCC filing system, much less the 
horse lien in this case. The Timothys' reliance on the Keetches misrepresentation was 
reasonable. 
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The Keetches have suggested that the Court erred in finding that their testimony 
was not credible. There is no evidence supporting this conclusion. The court is in the 
best position to make this determination, and the record supports the Court's finding. 
Additionally, the Keetches failed to brief their arguments on attorneys fees. The 
court should not hear any arguments on attorneys fees, and under R. 24 of Appellate 
Procedure, neither Lender nor Borrower may raise the issue of attorneys fees in this 
appeal except as directed in R. 24(a)(9). Pursuant to this rule, the Timothys request their 
attorneys fees incurred on appeal. 
Finally, any error made by the trial court is harmless because the court arrived at 
the same result on the Timothys' independent action for breach of contract. The Keetches 
have not appealed that finding. The judgment will stand against the Keetches regardless 
of the outcome of this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TIMOTHYS REASONABLY RELIED ON THE KEETCHES 
REPRESENTATION THAT THE HORSE WAS UN-ENCUMBERED EVEN 
THOUGH THEY DID NOT SEARCH UCC FILINGS. 
The Timothys' reliance on the Keetches was reasonable. Reasonable reliance is a 
factual "matter within the province of the jury." Armed Forces ins. Exchange v. 
Harrison, 2003 UT 14,1J34, 70 P.3d 35. For the Keetches to have the trial court's finding 
overturned, they must marshal all the evidence and establish by clear and convincing 
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evidence that even when viewed in a light most favorable to (the trial court, the findings of 
fact are clearly erroneous. Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84,^[27, 54 P.3d 1119. This 
standard has not been met. When they made a claim for fraud, the Timothys' reasonably 
relied on the Keetches representations about the horse even though they didn't search the 
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") filings. In points one and two of the Keetches 
brief, they argue that the presence of the UCC filing provided "constructive notice" to the 
Timothys that the Horse was encumbered. They also argue that because the Timothys had 
"constructive notice" of the encumbrance, they could not reasonably rely on the 
Timothys' misrepresentation that the horse was unencumbered. The Keetches cite J.R. 
Simplot Company et. al. v. Sales Kine Intl. et. al, in support of their argument. J.R. 
Simplot Company et. al. v. Sales Kine Intl. et. ah, 2000 UT 92, 17 P.2d 1100. J.R. 
Simplot Company has nothing to do with fraud, constructive notice or reasonable reliance. 
See e.g. Id. In JR. Simplot, the court determined that a fertilizer company which had 
perfected a security interest in a farm's crops by filing a security interest with the 
Division of Corporations had priority over a distributor who did not perfect its security 
interest in the crops because it filed its financing statement in the county recorder's office. 
Id. The JR. Simplot court does not refer to the term "constructive notice" and does not 
discuss its legal implications outside of the scope of UCC priority disputes. Id. J.R. 
Simplot is only instructive on how to resolve disputes between two equally situated 
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lenders, each with a valid claim for unpaid debt. The "constructive notice" given to 
competing lenders in a priority dispute does not defeat either lender's claim for fraud or 
breach of contract against the borrower. J.R. Simplot is irrelevant to this appeal. 
The Keetches also cite Maack v. Resource Design and Construction, 875 P.2d 570 
(Utah 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing v. 
Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LC; 2009 UT 65; 1ffl50-5l, 221 P.3d 234. Maack held 
that reasonable reliance in the context of negligent misrepresentation requires the victim 
to demonstrate that his reliance on the other party's statement "without some further 
inquiry was reasonable under the circumstances." Maack at 577. In Maack, the victim 
(Maack) had relied upon a statement that upon purchasing a home, he would obtain the 
benefit of a home warranty. Id. at 573-574. During the transaction, Maack did not ask for 
details about the warranty, did not review a copy of any warranty, and did not insist that 
any of the written documents refer to any home warranty. Id. at 577 Further, because 
significant time had elapsed between completion of the home and the sale in question, it 
was likely that any home warranty had expired or was close to expiring. Id. at 578. 
Finally, Maack was an attorney and new that the written documents stated that the home 
was sold "as is". Id. at 575, 577 These documents even stated that there were "no 
warranties other than those expressly stated" and that the written documents expressly 
disavowed any "prior oral or written agreements." Id. 
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The facts of this case are entirely different. The Keetches assured the Timothys 
that the horse was not encumbered. To investigate the issue, the Timothys asked the 
trainer of the horse who also said he was not aware of any lien on the horse. (T: 380: 8-
16). The Timothys also contacted the AQHA and verified with the AQHA that their 
records showed no lien on the horse. Further, the Timothys were not trained in the law 
and did know about the UCC filing system and did not know that a lien could be recorded 
on a horse in that way. Under these circumstances, it was proper for the court to find that 
the Timothys reasonably relied upon the misrepresentation. 
The Keetches also cite footnote 9 from Klas v. Van Wagoner, 829 P.2d 135 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). The footnote cites an Oklahoma court for the proposition that in real 
estate fraud cases, the victim of the misrepresentation must use reasonable diligence to 
uncover the truth. The Maack court points out that Utah has never adopted that standard. 
Even if Utah did adopt that standard, it is not helpful in this case because this case is not a 
real estate case. Further, the Timothys did use reasonable diligence in attempting to 
uncover the truth. 
Finally, the Keetches rely on Gold Standard v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060 (Utah 
1996). In Gold Standard v. Getty Oil Co., the court held that "even if GSI initially 
reasonably relied upon the oral promises made at the March 2, 1982 meeting, in light of 
the numerous writings denying such a promise, GSI could not have reasonably continued 
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to rely upon Getty's alleged promise." Id. at 1068. In other words, when a party makes 
an oral misrepresentation but later contradicts that representation in writing delivered to 
the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot be held to have exercised reasonable reliance if the 
plaintiff relies upon the oral representation. Id. That did not happen in this case. 
Having addressed the Keetches' arguments, the following demonstrates why the 
Timothys reasonably relied on a misrepresentation about the encumbered Horse even 
without knowing about the UCC and without searching UCC filings. 
a. The Timothy's reliance was reasonable without searching UCC filings 
The Timothy's reliance on Plaintiffs misrepresentations was reasonable. 
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. is instructive. In this case an escrow 
company represented that a land development company held an interest in property that it 
actually did not have. Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302 
(Utah 1983). The damaged party sued on the basis that it had received a representation 
indicating "that certain properties held in escrow had unencumbered equity values 
available as security for the plaintiff." Id. at 303. This was not true because the property 
was not owned by the development company. Unknown to the plaintiff, the public 
records of the County Recorder's Office showed that the representation was not true. On 
appeal, the court found in favor of the plaintiff noting that a defendant who misrepresents 
a material fact is liable to the plaintiff for damages unless the Plaintiff did not act 
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reasonably by failing to "inspect important documents that y/ertpart of the 
transaction...". Id. at 306 (emphasis added). The court differentiated between available 
documents that are part of a transaction and documents contained in public records. "[A] 
failure to examine public records does not defeat an action for a false representation 
because in most cases there is no duty to make such an examination. Thus, it has been 
held that in a fraud case a plaintiff who contracts to buy property is under no duty to 
examine public records to ascertain the true state of title claimed by the seller." Id. at 307 
{internal citations omitted) {emphasis added). 
This rule is again articulated in Despain v. Despain,%55 P.2d 254 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). In this case, the court found that a trial court's findings were not "clearly 
erroneous" when it denied a plaintiffs claim for fraud against her ex-husband. Id. at 257. 
The court found that while involved in a divorce proceeding, plaintiff could not rely on 
defendant's misrepresentation when she admitted that she did not trust defendant's other 
representations, she was represented by an attorney, she intended to inspect a title report 
that would have revealed the fraud and she failed to do so. Id. The circumstances made it 
apparent that she could not trust the defendant, did not trust defendant, and had the means 
and intent to uncover the defendant's fraud. Under those facts, the plaintiffs reliance 
was not reasonable. 
Borrower cites to Robinson v. Tripco Investments, 2000 UT App. 200, 21 P.3d 
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219. In Robinson, the court could not find that Plaintiffs was unreasonable in relying on 
defendant's misrepresentation as a matter of law. Id. at f21 (emphasis added; noting that 
because it could not find plaintiffs reliance unreasonable as a matter of law, the issue of 
reasonable reliance was a factual issue best decided by a trial court), (quoting Robinson v. 
Tripco Inv. Inc. 2000 UT App 200, 21 P.3d 219). This case sums up the legal principal in 
Despain and Christenson: "[i]n general, a plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive 
assertions of fact without independent investigation. It is only where, under the 
circumstances, the facts should make it apparent to one of his knowledge and intelligence, 
or he has discovered something which should serve as a warning that he is being 
deceived, that a plaintiff is required to make his own investigation." Id. at |20. The 
record indicates that the Timothys did not even know anything about UCC filing 
statements for horses-much less that a statement had actually been filed. No "facts" or 
"circumstances" made the Keetches' deception apparent. 
Moreover, the Timothys owned and raised several horses. They were experienced 
in raising and selling horses. The Timothy's reliance on the Keetches assertions that the 
horses were un-encumbered was reasonable. Notably, even though the District Court 
Judge also was unaware of UCC filings for horses, the Keetches still argue that the 
Timothys should understand the intricacies of the UCC to a greater extent than the 
District Court Judge because Mr. Timothy was a "sophisticated person" in contracts and 
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had his "real estate license". Appellants Brief, p. 28. In fact, the evidence did not support 
the Keetches' assertion that Mr. Timothy's experience as a real estate agent and his 
experience in negotiating contracts would make him aware of the intricacies of UCC 
filings for livestock. The Timothys' reliance was reasonable; 
II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE TIMOTHYS WERE 
CREDIBLE AND THE KEETCHES WERE NOT CREDIBLE BECAUSE 
THERE WAS NO DISCREPANCY IN THE TIMOTHYS5 TESTIMONIES. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, R. 52(a) states, in part: 
(a)... Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
A court's decision as to the credibility of a witness is not a legal conclusion as 
noted in Appellant's brief. Brief of Appellant, p. 3. Rather, "[t]o successfully 
demonstrate that a factual finding is clearly erroneous, the appellant must marshal all the 
evidence in favor of the factual finding and show that, even when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's factual finding, the favorable evidence is insufficient to 
support the finding. Moreover, in assessing whether a finding is clearly erroneous, 
reviewing courts must give 'due regard... to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses.'" Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, ^ |27, 54 P.3d 1119; See also 
Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ^ |2, 70 P.3d 35 (stating that in a fraud 
case, that the reviewing court must allow the trial court's due deference to resolve factual 
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disputes and to weigh the credibility of the evidence). The Keetches have failed to 
marshal the evidence and the evidence shows that the court did not error. 
a. The Keetches Failed to Marshall the Evidence 
The Supreme Court recently stated: 
To adequately fulfill the marshaling requirement, the appellant must temporarily 
assume the role of his adversary, presenting us,"in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the 
very findings the appellant resists" ...A recital of the trial court's findings with 
which the appellant disagrees does not amount to marshaling. Rather, the appellant 
must educate the court as to exactly how the trial court arrived at each of the 
challenged findings. This requires "a precisely focused summary of all the 
evidence supporting the findings," correlated to the location of that evidence in the 
record. Failure to provide this summary amounts to an invitation to the appellate 
court to invest its time and resources to "go behind the trial court's factual 
findings" itself; an invitation which the appellate court may, in its discretion, 
refuse. 
Friends ofMapleton Mt. Inc. v. Mapleton City, 2010 UT 11, 650 Utah Adv. Rep. 
28 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court went on to state that an 
appellant may not merely allege that the trial court's conclusions were "unhelpful," 
because this would turn the task of "marshaling on its head." Id. citing Jensen v. 
Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, f 101, 130 P.3d 325. The court also stated that appellant may not 
"reargue the facts." The appellant must "present the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the trial court and not attempt to construe them "in a light most favorable to their case." 
Id. Appellate court's don't retry the facts, they review them for "clear error." Id. 
The Keetches have argued on appeal that the court cannot find that both Paul and 
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Janice Timothy's testimony are credible because of purported discrepancies regarding the 
September 28th, 2001 meeting. Appellant's Brief, pg. 30. Paul Timothy testified that 
Thomas Keetch told him at the September 28, 2001 meeting that there were no existing 
liens on Hesa Son of a Dun. Rebecca Mendenhall testified that she did not recall any 
such conversation. To marshal the evidence, the Keetches must point out evidence in a 
light favorable to the Timothys. Specifically this evidence includes the following: 
Rebecca Mendenhall did not participate in the discussions, but acted as more of a 
"scribe." (T:346:14-17). Rebecca Mendenhairs recollection of all of the details of the 
meeting was lacking due to the amount of time between the meeting and the trial. 
(T:348:4-9). Further, the September 28, 2001 meeting lasted for several hours. (T:355:13-
14). Most significantly, in paragraph 12 of the court's findings, the court held that 
Rebecca Mendenhall's testimony was not credible and the court gave very little weight to 
her testimony. (R. 1023). Therefore, when the Keetches argued that Paul Timothy was 
not credible because his testimony was contradicted in one aspect by the testimony of 
Rebecca Mendenhall, as part of the requirement to marshal the evidence, the Keetches 
should have brought up the issues raised by the Timothys in this paragraph. 
The Keetches also claim that Paul and Janice Timothy contradicted each other on 
the issue of whether a prior lien on Hesa Son of a Dun was discussed at closing. Janice 
Timothy's testimony corroborates her husband's when she stated that it was "always 
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implied that he (the Horse) was free and clear." (T:280: 11-18). The Keetches ask this 
court to infer that Janice Timothy's testimony indicated that the issue was never 
discussed. Such an inference would be unfair to make. Paul Timothy testified that he 
asked Thomas Keetch about liens. Janice Timothy was asked whether Hesa Son of a Dun 
was "free and clear." If Janice Timothy had overhead the conversation about liens, her 
testimony that it was "implied that he was free and clear" is entirely consistent. After all, 
a lay person might reasonably understand that if a horse does not have a lien on it, the 
horse is free and clear. Janice Timothy further testified that "there was never any mention 
of him being collateralized" (T:280:17-18). Again, that testimony is consistent with Paul 
Timothy's testimony that on September 28, 2001 Thomas Keetch told Paul Timothy that 
there were no liens on Hesa Son of a Dun. A further plausible explanation for the Court 
to make is that during a two hour meeting, Janice Timothy may have stepped out 
momentarily or not been paying close attention. 
Even if the Keetches could successfully infer some contradiction in the Timothy's 
testimony, their argument would still be baseless. Viewed in a light most favorable to the 
findings of the trial court, even if a discrepancy theoretically existed in Janice Timothy's 
testimony, it is explained by the fact that she did not remember the facts as clearly as Paul 
Timothy. The trial court noted, "[although, the Timothy's memories have faded to some 
extent, they are both credible witnesses." (R: 1023). Taking this logic one step further, 
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even if her testimony was not credible, Paul Timothy's testimony alone, would lead the 
Court to the same conclusion that the Keetches committed fraud. He testified that Teri 
Keetch misrepresented facts at McDonald's and that Tom Keetch misrepresented facts at 
the closing on September 28th, 2001. The court found Paul Timothy's testimony credible. 
To marshal the evidence, the Keetches have an obligation to also cite to the 
evidence indicating that Mr. Timothy was credible. For example, Mr. Timothy testified 
that Mrs. Keetch had told him she needed exactly $83,500 in order to pay off a loan on 
her "brood mares." (T:376:8-21). Mr. Timothy testified that at closing, Thomas Keetch 
repeated that they needed exactly $83,500. (T:390:12-15). Because the Timothys had 
obtained a second mortgage on their home to loan the money, but the home lender took 
out closing costs, the amount they obtained from the home loan was $309 short of the 
required $83,500. Therefore, Paul Timothy wrote a separate $309 check to make the total 
of $83,500. Mr. Timothy's testimony is corroborated by exhibits 7 and 8 which are the 
two checks totaling $83,500. See Addendum, Exh. "G" and "H". Because exhibits 7 and 
8 bolster Mr. Timothy's credibility, the Keetches should have marshaled that evidence. 
Additional evidence that the Keetches should have marshaled was the testimony of 
Rebecca Mendenhall. Rebecda Mendenhall brokered the loan at issue in this case. 
Rebecca Mendenhall testified that Teri Keetch told her she needed a loan for $83,500 in 
order to pay off a herd of horses. (T:3232:24-324:16, 333:8-15). Both Mr. and Mrs. 
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Keetch said that it was critical that they get at least $83,500 and they needed it no later 
than 24 hours after the closing date in order to save the herd. (T:341:2-25) Rebecca 
Mendenhall also testified that Teri Keetch told Rebecca that Teri Keetch was willing to 
use a horse that she owned, a horse named Hesa Son of a Dun, valued at $125,000 to 
$150,000 as collateral on the loan with the Timothys. Teri Keetch never told Rebecca 
Mendenhall that there was a lien on the horse. (T:327:4-327:24, 333:4-7). Rebecca 
Mendenhall also testified that neither Thomas Keetch nor Teri Keetch ever mentioned 
any bankruptcy until after the loan closing. (T:332:25-333:3). After the Timothy loan 
closed and the prior lender seized Hesa Son of a Dun, Teri Keetch called Rebecca 
Mendenhall and admitted that she was in bankruptcy and that Hesa Son of a Dun was 
subject to a prior lien secured before closing. Rebecca Mendenhall confronted Mrs. 
Keetch in regards to why that information had not been disclosed to herself and the 
Timothys prior to the Timothy loan closing. Mrs. Keetch did not say why she withheld 
that information. (T:336:14-338:2). This testimony corroborates the testimony of Paul 
Timothy and should have been cited by the Keetches as part of their requirement to 
marshal the evidence. 
The Keetches argument really goes beyond the credibility of Mr. Timothy. Their 
argument is that the evidence does not support the finding of fraud. In fact, the evidence 
is overwhelming. 
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Thomas Keetch misrepresented, could not remember, or did not know how he used 
$83,500.00 in loan proceeds. He misrepresented to whom and how much he paid these 
proceeds and misrepresented what they were used for. His testimony contradicted itself 
frequently and differed from his deposition. He misrepresented how much he had paid in 
restitution after entering into a plea in abeyance for criminal charges arising out of the 
same incident. He misrepresented information on his bankruptcy petition. He 
misrepresented his involvement and misrepresented details about the horse lien and his 
bankruptcy. 
Teri Keetch misrepresented her involvement in her bankruptcy proceeding and 
even gave testimony contradictory to her sworn statement made in bankruptcy court. She 
misrepresented the prior encumbrance on Hesa Son of a Dun. She lied about the intended 
use of the loan and contradicted herself at trial about her intended uses of the loan. She 
then admitted that she had misled Paul Timothy at their meeting in McDonald's. She then 
contradicted her husband, co-defendant Thomas Keetch, regarding whether she signed 
loan documents. She then contradicted her own deposition testimony regarding her 
signature on the loan documents. She then misrepresented how much of the loan proceeds 
she had paid directly to her Mom. She lied about her involvement with the Keetch ranch 
and her testimony contradicted her own testimony and that of her own brother. Her 
testimony differed from that of Jake Stephens regarding the seizure of the horse. Jake 
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Stephens is a disinterested third party, who had no motivation to lie. Jake Stephens then 
informed the court that Teri Keetch had a reputation in the community for being a 
habitual liar. Teri Keetch's own brother informed the court the Teri had lied during her 
own deposition. Teri Keetch admitted that she never told Paul or Janice Timothy that 
Hesa Son of a Dun was already encumbered because she thought Rebecca Mendenhall 
would tell them. 
III. THE KEETCHES HAVE NOT BRIEFED THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEYS 
FEES. 
The Keetches' brief notes attorneys fees in its issues and standard of review, but 
this issue remains un-briefed. Under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, R. 24, the 
Appellant must identify the issues for review. Borrowers' have failed to brief the issue of 
attorney's fees. The Utah supreme court has stated: 
..petitioners seeking judicial review must identify the legal or factual errors of the 
lower court or agency. We have consistently declined to review issues that are not 
adequately briefed. And we have long held that it is improper to "mak[e] blanket 
assertions and leav[e] the responsibility to the court to ferret out evidence from the 
record to support [them]." Ball v. Pub. Serv. Comm. (In re. Questar Gas Co.) 2007 
UT79, 175P.3d545. 
The Keetches have not made an assertion of legal or factual error. The lone 
citation to authority is the same case cited by the trial court when it found in favor of the 
Timothys. See Kealarnakia, Inc. v. Kealamakia, 2009 UT App 148, 213 P.3d 13. The 
Timothys are unable to address this issue because the Keetches have failed to make any 
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factual or legal arguments to show that the trial court erred. In order to make an 
argument, the Timothys would be forced to guess what arguments the Keetches might 
have made. Because the award of attorneys fees was supported by the evidence and the 
law, the Timothys cannot guess what the Keetches intended to argue. This court should 
not hear any arguments on this issue. 
IV. THE TIMOTHYS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR ATTORNEYS FEES 
INCURRED IN CHALLENGING THIS APPEAL, 
The Timothys seek their attorneys fees incurred for this appeal. Under R. 24(a)(9) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party seeking attorneys' fees incurred on 
appeal must make a specific request and state the legal basis for an award of attorneys' 
fees. Under R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook attorneys may collect their attorneys fees on appeal 
on the same basis as they were awarded in the trial court, R. T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 
UT 11, Tf27, 40 P.3d 1119 (awarding fees on appeal for a breach of contract action). 
Attorneys fees may also be awarded in equity in a case involving fraud. Doctors' Co. v. 
Drezga, 2009 UT 60, |32, 218 P.3d 598. In this case, the Timothys prevailed in their 
breach of contract and fraud actions and the trial court awarded attorneys fees-assessing 
that the damages for fraud were identical to breach of contract. (R. 1011). On appeal, The 
Timothys' attorneys fees have increased. Since the Timothys have established that the 
trial court did not err, they are entitled to collect additional fees incurred on appeal. This 
court should remand this case with a specific order to the trial court to receive evidence 
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and make a finding and award attorneys fees incurred on appeal. 
V. THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE ANY ERRORS ARE 
HARMLESS. 
The Keetches challenge the judgment because they claim no fraud occurred. Even 
if that were true, the judgment would still stand in the same amount because the 
Keeetches breached their contract with the Timothys. The Keetches have made no 
argument on appeal regarding the trial court's finding of breach of contract. The trial 
court stated that under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, R. 61, a judgment should not be 
disturbed for harmless error. The rule states: 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or 
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment 
or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with 
substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any 
error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties. Utah R. Civ. P. R. 61. 
The trial court found in favor of the Timothys on the independent grounds of 
breach of contract and fraud. The measure of damages were the same for each cause of 
action. (R. 1013-1017). The Keetches do not claim that the court erred in finding breach 
of contract and awarding damages for this breach. When the outcome of the case is not 
affected, the appellate court should find any error harmless. Armed Forces Ins. Exck v. 
Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ^  22, 70 P.3d 35. The court stated, "[i]f the error was harmless, 
that is, if the error was sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood 
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that it affected the outcome of the case, then a reversal is not in order." Id. See also State 
v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121, fn. 10. (Utah 1989) (discussing and classifying various types 
of eiTor). Utah appellate court have also described harmless error as an error that affects 
the "substantial rights'5 of the parties where the outcome of the case would be affected 
minus the error. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 796-797 (Utah 1991); See 
also ProMaxDev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 256 (Utah Ct App. 1997). 
The Keetches may argue that an error on the issue of fraud is not harmless because 
it impacts whether the debt is dischargeable in bankruptcy. This is not the case. Under 
11 U.S.C. 523(a) "[a] discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228 (a), 1228 (b), or 1328 (b) 
of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt" when the debt was for 
"money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the 
extent obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a 
statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;" 11 U.S.C. 523(a) 2 
(A). Under the previous version of the bankruptcy code, Utah courts have recognized that 
bankruptcy law does not discharge debts obtained by false pretenses. See e.g. Gear v. 
Davis, 435 P.2d 923 (Utah 1966)(holding that a debt secured by false pretenses or false 
oral representations was not discharged). A debt for money obtained under a simple 
contract action is dischargeable without a showing of fraud or false pretenses. Jensen v. 
Barrick, 391 P.2d 429 (Utah 1964). However, debt secured by a contract that was 
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obtained by fraud or false pretenses is not dischargeable in bankruptcy even if the 
plaintiff sued under a breach of contract theory rather than common law fraud: 
We believe that a loan, evidenced by a promissory note, which is obtained by fraud 
is excepted from a discharge in bankruptcy. This being so, the plaintiff here could 
maintain its action on the note and was not confined to an action based upon fraud. 
National Fin, Co. v. Valdez, 359 P.2d 9, 9 (Utah 1961). 
Federal bankruptcy courts agree with this position. In re. Schnuelle v. Schnuelle, 
Nos. Bk07-42289-TJM, A08-4014-TJM, (U.S. Bankruptcy, Dist. Neb. 2010). In In re. 
Schnuelle a farmer obtained financing secured by his crops. He misrepresented data on 
his balance sheets and fed the secured crops to his cattle. The court then defined fraud 
and false pretenses in this context. False pretenses are misrepresentations or "any other 
conduct that amounts to an assertion not in accordance with the truth." Id. Like the 
famer in In re. Schnuelle v. Schnuelle, this definition is broad enough to encompass the 
Timothys' claim for breach of contract when the Keetches' loan was obtained by "false 
pretenses" and the Keetches' false statements. (R. 1009). Therefore, 11 U.S.C. 523(a) 2 
(A) applies. 
In this appeal, the Keetches do not dispute the findings of misrepresentation or 
false pretenses. Instead the Keetches dispute one element of fraud, ie. reasonable 
reliance. Even if this court were to find that the element of reasonable reliance was not 
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met, the Keetches debt will not be discharged because the debt was made under false 
pretenses. Any error made in regards to the Timothys' action for fraud is harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
The Keetches are not entitled to relief because the trial court did not err when it 
found that the Timothys reasonably relied on the Keetches' misrepresentation. The 
Timothys' reliance was reasonable even though they did not search UCC filings. There is 
no duty to search public records to show that a plaintiffs reliance is reasonable when that 
plaintiff alleges fraud. The Keetches have failed to marshal the evidence to show that the 
court erred in finding the Keetches' testimony unreliable and the Timothys' testimony 
reliable. Finally, the Keetches have not briefed the issue of attorneys fees. The Timothys 
are entitled to their reasonable attorneys fees incurred on appeal, and any error made by 
the trial court is harmless. 
Dated this _ day of May, 2010. 
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Nelson Abbott, 
Attorney for Appellee, Paul and Janice Timothy 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit "A" 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, R. 52(a): 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and 
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for 
purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a 
master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the 
court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally 
and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court 
shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all 
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on 
more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of 
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend 
the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial 
pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without 
a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may 
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in the district 
court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion 
for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(c)(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(c)(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(c)(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
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(d) Correction of the record. If anything material is omitted from or misstated in the 
transcript of an audio or video record of a hearing or trial, or if a disagreement arises as to 
whether the record accurately discloses what occurred in the proceeding, a party may 
move to correct the record. The motion must be filed within 10 days after the transcript of 
the hearing is filed, unless good cause is shown. The omission, misstatement or 
disagreement shall be resolved by the court and the record made to accurately reflect the 
proceeding. 
Exhibit "B 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, R. 24(b)(1): 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order indicated: 
1. (a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose 
judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on 
appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page 
which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, 
rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where 
they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the 
standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial 
court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be 
set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is 
lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an 
addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the 
case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the 
facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and 
references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in 
accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be 
a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall 
not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of 
the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees 
incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such 
an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(l 1) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this 
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the 
brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall 
contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(l 1)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance 
cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(l 1)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; 
in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the 
court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)(l 1)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or 
the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the 
statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the 
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if 
the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of 
the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to 
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief 
shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No 
further briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral 
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" 
and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the 
agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the 
employee," "the injured person,' "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the 
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the 
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). 
References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential 
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right 
corner and each separately numbered page(s) referred to withiii the deposition or 
transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit 
numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, 
offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 
50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the 
table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, 
regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases 
involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a 
notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the 
court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs. No brief shall 
exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in 
the appeal 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-
Appellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present 
the issues raised in the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief 
of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of 
Cross-
Appellant. 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to 
the Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for 
good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the 
limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be briefed, the 
number of additional pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A 
motion filed at least seven days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer 
additional pages need not be accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than 
seven days before the date the brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall 
be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is 
granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without 
further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft brief will be 
destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than 
one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any 
number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant qr appellee may adopt by 
reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come 
to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but 
before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter 
setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme 
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There 
shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The 
body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. Any response shall be made within 7 days 
of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with 
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded 
or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees 
against the offending lawyer. 
Exhibit "C 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, R. 61: 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in 
any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is 
ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal 
to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at 
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which 
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
Exhibit "D 
United States Statutes 
Title 11. Bankruptcy 
Chapter 5. CREDITORS, THE DEBTOR, AND THE 
ESTATE 
Subchapter II. DEBTORS DUTIES AND BENEFITS 
CutientthoughPL 111 126 
§ 523.Exceptions to Discharge 
(a) 
A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228 (a), 1228 (b), 
or 1328 (b) of this title does not discharge an individual 
debtor from any debt-
(i) 
for a tax or a customs duty-
(A) 
of the kind and for the periods specified in section 507 
(a)(3) or 507 (a)(8) of this title, whether or not a claim for 
such tax was filed or allowed, 
(B) 
with respect to which a return, or equivalent report or 
notice, if required-
(>) 
was not filed or given, or 
do 
was filed or given after the date on which such return, 
report, or notice was last due, under applicable law or 
under any extension, and after two years before the date 
of the filing of the petition, or 
( Q 
with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return 
or willfully attempted m any manner to evade or defeat 
such tax, 
(2) 
for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, 
or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by-
(A) 
other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an 
insider's financial condition, 
(B) 
use of a statement in writing-
0) 
that is materially false, 
(«) 
respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition, 
(Ml) 
on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for 
such money, property, services, or credit reasonably 
relied, and 
(iv) 
that the debtor caused to be made or published with 
intent to deceive, or 
(C) 
(1) 
for purposes of subparagraph (A)~ 
(I) 
consumer debts owed to a single creditor and 
aggregating more than $500 for luxury goods or services 
incurred by an individual debtor on or within 90 days 
before the order for relief under this title are presumed to 
be nondischargeable, and 
(ID 
cash advances aggregating more than $750 that are 
extensions of consumer credit under an open end credit 
plan obtained by an individual debtor on or within 70 
days before the order for relief under this title, are 
presumed to be nondischargeable, and 
(ii) 
for purposes of tins subparagraph— 
a) 
the terms consumer', credit', and open end credit plan' 
have the same meanings as in section 103 of the Truth in 
Lending Act, and 
(II) 
false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, the term "luxury goods or services" does not include 
goods or services reasonably necessary foi the support or 
maintenance of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor 
(3) 
neither listed nor scheduled under section 521 (1) of this 
title, with the name, if known to the debtor, of the 
creditor to whom such debt is owed, in time to permit-
(A) 
if such debt is not of a kind specified m paragraph (2), 
(4), or (6) of tins subsection, timely filing of a proof of 
claim, unless such creditor had notice or actual 
knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing, or 
(B) 
if such debt is of a kind specified m paragraph (2), (4), or 
(6) of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim 
and timely request for a determination of dischargeability 
of such debt under one of such paragraphs, unless such 
creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in 
tune for such timely filing and request, 
(4) 
for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary 
capacity, embezzlement, or larceny, 
(5) 
for a domestic support obligation, 
(6) 
for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another 
entity or to the property of another entity, 
(7) 
to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture 
payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and 
is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss, other than 
a tax penalty-
(A) 
relating to a tax of a kind not specified m paragraph (1) 
of this subsection, or 
(B) 
imposed with respect to a transaction or event that 
occurred before three years before the date of the filing of 
the petition, 
(8) 
unless excepting such debt from discharge under this 
paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor 
and the debtor's dependents, for— 
(A) 
0) 
an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, 
insured, oi guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made 
under any program funded m whole or in part by a 
governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or 
(u) 
an obligation to repay funds received as an educational 
benefit, scholarship, or stipend, or 
(B) 
any other educational loan that is a qualified education 
loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who is an 
individual, 
(9) 
for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's 
operation of a motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft if such 
operation was unlawful because the debtor was 
intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another 
substance, 
(10) 
that was or could have been listed or scheduled by the 
debtor in a prior case concerning the debtor under this 
title or under the Bankruptcy Act in which the debtor 
waived discharge, or was denied a discharge under 
section 727 (a)(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), or (7) of this title, or 
under section 14c(l), (2), (3), (4), (6), or (7) of such Act, 
(ID 
provided m any final judgment, unreviewable order, or 
consent order or decree entered in any court of the United 
States or of any State, issued by a Federal depository 
institutions regulatory agency, or contained in any 
settlement agreement entered into by the debtor, arising 
from any act of fraud or defalcation while acting in a 
fiduciary capacity committed with respect to any 
depository institution or insured credit union, 
(12) 
for malicious or reckless failure to fulfill any 
commitment by the debtor to a Federal depository 
institutions regulatory agency to maintain the capital of 
an insured depository institution, except that this 
paragraph shall not extend any such commitment which 
would otherwise be terminated due to any act of such 
agency, 
(13) 
for any payment of an order of restitution issued under 
title 18, United States Code, (A) 
(14) 
incurred to pay a tax to the United States that would be 
nondischargeable pursuant to paragraph (1), 
(14A) 
incurred to pay a tax to a governmental unit, other than 
the United States, that would be nondischargeable under 
paragraph (1), 
(14B) 
incurred to pay fines or penalties imposed under Federal 
election law, 
(15) 
to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor and not 
of the kind described m paragraph (5) that is incurred by 
the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or m 
connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree 
oi other order of a court of record or, a determination 
made in accordance with State or territorial law by a 
governmental umt, 
(16) 
for a fee or assessment that becomes due and payable 
after the order for relief to a membership association with 
respect to the debtor's interest m a umt that has 
condominium ownership, in a share of a cooperative 
corporation, or a lot in a homeowners association, for as 
long as the debtor or the trustee has a legal, equitable, or 
possessory ownership interest m such unit, such 
corporation, or such lot, but nothing m this paragraph 
shall except from discharge the debt of a debtor for a 
membership association fee or assessment for a period 
ansmg before entry of the order for relief m a pending or 
subsequent bankruptcy case, 
(17) 
for a fee imposed on a prisoner by any court for the 
filing of a case, motion, complaint, or appeal, or for other 
costs and expenses assessed with respect to such filing, 
regardless of an assertion of poverty by the debtor under 
subsection (b) or (f)(2) of section 1915 of title 28 (or a 
similar non-Federal law), or the debtor's status as a 
prisoner, as defined in section 1915 (h) of title 28 (or a 
similar non-Federal law), 
(18) 
owed to a pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or other 
plan established under section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 
457, or 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 
under-
a loan permitted under section 408(b)(1) of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, or 
subject to section 72(p) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986, or 
(B) 
a loan from a thrift savings plan permitted under 
subchapter III of chapter 84 of title 5, that satisfies the 
requirements of section 8433(g) of such title, 
but nothing in this paragraph may be construed to provide 
that any loan made under a governmental plan under 
section 414(d), or a contract or account undei section 
403(b), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 constitutes 
a claim or a debt under this title, or 
(19) 
that-
(A) 
is for-
(0 
the violation of any of the Federal securities laws (as that 
term is defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934), any of the State securities laws, 
or any regulation or order issued under such Federal or 
State securities laws, or 
(") 
common law fraud, deceit, or manipulation in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security, and 
(B) 
results, before, on, or after the date on which the petition 
was filed, from-
(0 
any judgment, order, consent order, or decree entered m 
any Federal or State judicial or administrative 
proceeding, 
(«) 
any settlement agreement entered into by the debtor, or 
(in) 
any court or administrative order for any damages, fine, 
penalty, citation, restitutionary payment, disgorgement 
payment, attorney fee, cost, or other payment owed by 
the debtor 
For purposes of this subsection, the term " return' means a 
return that satisfies the requirements of applicable 
nonbankruptcy law (including applicable filing 
requirements) Such term includes a return prepared 
pursuant to section 6020(a) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986, or similar State or local law, or a written 
stipulation to a judgment or a final order entered by a 
nonbankruptcy tribunal, but does not include a return 
made pursuant to section 6020(b) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, or a similar State or local law 
(b) 
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a debt 
that was excepted from discharge under subsection (a)(1), 
(a)(3), or (a)(8) of this section, under section 17a(l), 
17a(3), or 17a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, under section 
439A [1] of the Higher Education Act of 1965, or under 
section 733(g) [1] of the Public Health Service Act in a 
prior case concerning the debtor under this title, or under 
the Bankruptcy Act, is dischargeable in a case under this 
title unless, by the terms of subsection (a) of this section, 
such debt is not dischargeable in the case under this title 
(c) 
(1) 
Except as provided m subsection (a)(3)(B) of this 
section, the debtor shall be discharged from a debt of a 
kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of subsection 
(a) of this section, unless, on request of the creditor to 
whom such debt is owed, and after notice and a hearing, 
the court determines such debt to be excepted from 
discharge under paragraph (2), (4), or (6), as the case may 
be, of subsection (a) of tins section 
(2) 
Paragraph (1) shall not apply m the case of a Federal 
depository institutions regulatory agency seeking, in its 
capacity as conservator, receiver, or liquidating agent for 
an insured depository institution, to recover a debt 
described m subsection (a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(6), or(a)(ll) 
owed to such institution by an institution-affiliated party 
unless the receiver, conservator, or liquidating agent was 
appointed in time to reasonably comply, or for a Federal 
depository institutions regulatory agency acting m its 
corporate capacity as a successor to such receiver, 
conservator, or liquidating agent to reasonably comply, 
with subsection (a)(3)(B) as a creditor of such 
institution-affiliated party with respect to such debt 
(d) 
If a creditor requests a determination of dischargeability 
of a consumer debt under subsection (a)(2) of this 
section, and such debt is discharged, the court shall grant 
judgment in favor of the debtor for the costs of, and a 
reasonable attorney's fee for, the proceeding if the court 
finds that the position of the creditor was not 
substantially justified, except that the court shall not 
award such costs and fees if special circumstances would 
make the award unjus^ 
(e) 
Any institution-affiliated party of an insured depository 
institution shall be considered to be acting m a fiduciary 
capacity with respect to the purposes of subsection (a)(4) 
o r ( l l ) 
[1] See References in Text note below 
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Historical and Revision Notes 
legislative statements 
Section 523 (a)(1) represents a compromise between the 
position taken in the House bill and the Senate 
amendment Section 523 (a)(2) likewise represents a 
compromise between the position taken in the House bill 
and the Senate amendment with respect to the false 
financial statement exception to discharge In order to 
clarify that a "renewal of credit" includes a "refinancing 
of credit", explicit reference to a refinancing of credit is 
made m the preamble to section 523 (a)(2) A renewal of 
credit or refinancing of credit that was obtained by a false 
financial statement within the terms of section 523 (a)(2) 
is nondischargeable However, each of the provisions of 
section 523 (a)(2) must be proved Thus, under section 
523 (a)(2)(A) a creditor must prove that the debt was 
obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or 
actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the 
debtor's or an insider's financial condition Subparagraph 
(A) is intended to codify current case law e g , Neal v 
Clark, 95 U S 704 (1887) [24 L Ed 586], which 
interprets "fraud" to mean actual or positive fraud rather 
than fraud implied in law Subparagraph (A) is mutually 
exclusive from subparagraph (B) Subparagraph (B) 
pertains to the so-called false financial statement In order 
for the debt to be nondischargeable, the creditor must 
prove that the debt was obtained by the use of a statement 
m writing (l) that is materially false, (n) respecting the 
debtor's or an insider's financial condition, (in) on which 
the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for obtaining 
money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied, 
(IV) that the debtor caused to be made or published with 
intent to deceive Section 523 (a)(2)(B)(iv) is not 
intended to change from present law since the statement 
that the debtor causes to be made or published with the 
intent to deceive automatically includes a statement that 
the debtor actually makes or publishes with an intent to 
deceive Section 523 (a)(2)(B) is explained m the House 
report Under section 523 (a)(2)(B)(i) a discharge is 
barred only as to that portion of a loan with respect to 
which a false financial statement is materially false 
In many cases, a creditor is required by state law to 
refinance existing credit on which there has been no 
default If the creditor does not forfeit remedies or 
otherwise rely to his detriment on a false financial 
statement with respect to existing credit, then an 
extension, renewal, or refinancing of such credit is 
nondischargeable only to the extent of the new money 
advanced, on the other hand, if an existing loan is m 
default or the creditor otherwise reasonably relies to his 
detriment on a false financial statement with regard to an 
existing loan, then the entire debt is nondischargeable 
under section 523 (a)(2)(B) This codifies the reasomng 
expressed by the second circuit m In re Danns, 558 F 2d 
114(2dCir 1977) 
Section 523(a)(3) of the House amendment is derived 
from the Senate amendment The provision is intended to 
overrule Birkett v Columbia Bank, 195 U S 345 (1904) 
[25 SCt 38,49 L Ed 231,12 AmBankrRep 691] 
Section 523(a)(4) of the House amendment represents a 
compromise between the House bill and the Senate 
amendment 
Section 523 (a)(5) is a compromise between the House 
bill and the Senate amendment The provision excepts 
from discharge a debt owed to a spouse, former spouse or 
child of the debtor, in connection with a separation 
agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement 
agreement, for alimony to, mamtenance for, or support of 
such spouse or child but not to the extent that the debt is 
assigned to another entity If the debtor has assumed an 
obligation of the debtor's spouse to a third party m 
connection with a separation agreement, property 
settlement agreement, or divorce proceeding, such debt is 
dischargeable to the extent that payment of the debt by 
the debtor is not actually in the nature ol alimony, 
maintenance, or support of debtor's spouse, former 
spouse, or child 
Section 523 (a)(6) adopts the position taken m the House 
bill and rejects the alternative suggested m the Senate 
amendment The phrase "willful and malicious injury" 
covers a willful and malicious conversion 
Section 523(a)(7) of the House amendment adopts the 
position taken in the Senate amendment and rejects the 
position taken in the House bill A penalty relating to a 
tax cannot be nondischargeable unless the tax itself is 
nondischargeable 
Section 523 (a)(8) represents a compromise between the 
House bill and the Senate amendment regarding 
educational loans Tins provision is broader lhan current 
law which is limited to federally insured loans Only 
educational loans owing to a governmental umt or a 
nonprofit institution of higher education are made 
nondischargeable under this paragraph 
Section 523 (b) is new The section represents a 
modification of similar provisions contained in the House 
bill and the Senate amendment 
Section 523(c) of the House amendment adopts the 
position taken in the Senate amendment 
Section 523 (d) represents a compromise between the 
position taken in the House bill and the Senate 
amendment on the issue of attorneys' fees m false 
financial statement complaints to determine 
dischargeability The provision contained m the House 
bill permitting the court to award damages is eliminated 
The court must grant the debtor judgment or a reasonable 
attorneys' fee unless the granting of judgment would be 
clearly inequitable 
Nondischargeable debts The House amendment retains 
the basic categories of nondischargeable tax liabilities 
contained in both bills, but restricts the time limits on 
certain nondischargeable taxes Under the amendment, 
nondischargeable taxes cover taxes entitled to priority 
under section 507(a)(6) of title 11 and, in the case of 
individual debtors under chapters 7, 11, or 13, tax 
liabilities with respect to which no required return had 
been filed or as to which a late return had been filed if the 
return became last due, including extensions, within 2 
years before the date of the petition or became due after 
the petition or as to which the debtor made a fraudulent 
return, entry or invoice or fraudulently attempted to 
evade or defeat the tax 
In the case of individuals in liquidation under chapter 7 or 
in reorganization under chapter 11 of title 11, section 
1141 (d)(2) incorporates by reference the exceptions to 
discharge continued m section 523 Different rules 
concerning the discharge of taxes where a partnership or 
corporation reorganizes under chapter 11, apply under 
section 1141 
The House amendment also deletes the reduction rule 
contained in section 523(e) of the Senate amendment 
Under that rule, the amount of an otherwise 
nondischargeable tax liability would be reduced by the 
amount which a governmental tax authority could have 
collected from the debtor's estate if it had filed a timely 
claim against the estate but which it did not collect 
because no such claim was filed Tins provision is deleted 
in order not to effectively compel a tax authority to file 
claim against the estate m "no asset" cases, along with a 
dischargeability petition In no-asset cases, therefore, if 
the tax authority is not potentially penalized by failing to 
file a claim, the debtor in such cases will have a better 
opportunity to choose the prepayment forum, bankruptcy 
court or the Tax Court, m which to litigate Ins personal 
liability for a nondischargeable tax 
The House amendment also adopts the Senate 
amendment provision limiting the nondischargeabihty of 
punitive tax penalties, that is, penalties other than those 
which represent collection of a principal amount of tax 
liability through the foftn of a "penalty " Under the House 
amendment, tax penalties which are basically punitive in 
nature are to be nondischargeable only if the penalty is 
computed by reference to a related tax liability winch is 
nondischargeable or, if the amount of the penalty is not 
computed by reference to a tax liability, the transaction or 
event giving rise to the penalty occurred during the 
3-year penod ending on the date of the petition 
senate report no. 95-989 
This section specifies which of the debtor's debts are not 
discharged in a bankruptcy case, and certain procedures 
for effectuating the section The provision m Bankruptcy 
Act § 17c [section 35(c) of former title 11] granting the 
bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to determine 
dischargeability is deleted as unnecessary, in view of the 
comprehensive grant of jurisdiction prescribed in 
proposed 28 U S C 1334 (b), which is adequate to cover 
the full jurisdiction that the bankruptcy courts have today 
over dischargeability and related issues under Bankruptcy 
Act § 17c The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure will 
specify, as they do today, who may request 
determinations of dischargeability, subject, of course, to 
proposed 11 U S C 523 (c) , and when such a request 
may be made Proposed 11USC 350,providing for 
reopening of cases, provides one possible procedure for a 
determination of dischargeability and related issues after 
a case is closed 
Subsection (a) lists nine kinds of debts excepted from 
discharge Taxes that are excepted from discharge are set 
forth m paragraph (1) These include claims against the 
debtor which receive priority m the second, third and 
sixth categories (§ 507(a)(3)(B) and (c) and (6)) These 
categories include taxes for which the tax authority failed 
to file a claim against the estate or filed its claim late 
Whether or not the taxing authority's claim is secured will 
also not affect the claim's nondischargeabihty if the tax 
liability in question is otherwise entitled to priority 
Also included m the nondischargeable debts are taxes for 
which the debtor had not filed a required return as of the 
petition date, or for which a return had been filed beyond 
its last permitted due date (§ 523(a)(1)(B)) For tins 
purpose, the date of the tax yeai to which the return 
relates is immaterial The late return rule applies, 
however, only to the late returns filed within three years 
before the petition was filed, and to late returns filed after 
the petition m title 11 was filed For this purpose, the 
taxable year in question need not be one or more of the 
three years immediately preceding the filing of the 
petition 
Tax claims with respect to which the debtor filed a 
fraudulent return, entry or invoice, or fraudulently 
attempted to evade or defeat any tax (§ 523(a)(1)(C)) are 
included The date of the taxable year with regard to 
which the fraud occurred is immatenal 
Also included are tax payments due under an agreement 
for deferred payment of taxes, which a debtor had entered 
into with the Internal Revenue Service (or State or local 
tax authority) before the filing of the petition and which 
relate to aprepetition tax liability (§ 523(a)(1)(D)) are 
also nondischargeable This classification applies only to 
tax claims winch would have received priority under 
section 507 (a) if the taxpayer had filed a title 11 petition 
on the date on which the deferred payment agreement 
was entered into This rule also applies only to 
installment payments which become due dunng and after 
the commencement of the title 11 case Payments winch 
had become due withm one year before the filing of the 
petition receive sixth priority, and will be 
nondischargeable under the general rule of section 523 
(a)(1)(A) 
The above categories ofnondischargeabihty apply to 
customs duties as well as to taxes 
Paragraph (2) provides that as under Bankruptcy Act § 
17a(2) [section 35(a)(2) of fonner title 11], a debt for 
obtaining money, property, services, or a refinancing 
extension or renewal of credit by false pretenses, a false 
representation, or actual fraud, or by use of a statement m 
writing respecting the debtor's financial condition that is 
materially false, on which the creditor reasonably relied, 
and which the debtor made or published with intent to 
deceive, is excepted from discharge Tins provision is 
modified only slightly from current section 17a (2) First, 
"actual fraud" is added as a ground for exception from 
discharge Second, the creditor must not only have relied 
on a false statement in writing, but the reliance must have 
been reasonable This codifies case law construing 
present section 17a (2) Third, the phrase "m any manner 
whatsoever" that appears in current law after "made or 
published" is deleted as unnecessary, the word 
"published" is used in the same sense that it is used m 
defamation cases 
Unscheduled debts are excepted from discharge under 
paragraph (3) The provision, derived from section 17a 
(3) [section 35(a)(3) of fonner title 11], follows current 
law, butclanfies some uncertainties generated by the 
case law construing 17a(3) The debt is excepted from 
discharge if it was not scheduled m time to permit timely 
action by the creditor to protect his rights, unless the 
creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case 
Paragraph (4) excepts debts for fraud mcwred by the 
debtor while actmg m a fiduciary capacity or for 
defalcation, embezzlement, or misappropnation 
Paragraph (5) provides that debts for willful and 
malicious conversion or injury by the debtor to another 
entity or the property of another entity are 
nondischargeable Under this paragraph "willful" means 
deliberate or intentional To the extent that Tinker v 
Colwell, 139 US 473 (1902), held that a less stnct 
standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases 
have relied on Tinker to apply a "reckless disiegard" 
standard, they are overruled 
Paragraph (6) excepts from discharge debts to a spouse, 
fonner spouse, or child of the debtor for alimony to, 
maintenance for, or support of the spouse or child This 
language, m combination with the repeal of section 
456(b) of the Social Secunty Act (42 U S C 656 (b)) by 
section 326 of the bill, will apply to make 
nondischargeable only alimony, maintenance, or support 
owed directly to a spouse or dependent What constitutes 
alimony, maintenance, or support, will be determined 
under the bankruptcy law, not State law Thus, cases such 
as In re Waller, 494 F2d 447 (6th Cir 1974), are 
overruled, and the result m cases such as Fife \ Fife, 1 
Utah 2d 281, 265 P 2d 642 (1952) is followed The 
proviso, however, makes nondischargeable any debts 
resulting from an agreement by the debtor to hold the 
debtor's spouse harmless on joint debts, to the extent that 
the agreement is m payment of alimony, maintenance, or 
support of the spouse, as determined under bankruptcy 
law consideiations as to whether a particular agreement 
to pay money to a spouse is actually alimony or a 
property settlement 
Paragraph (7) makes nondischargeable certain liabilities 
for penalties including tax penalties if the underlying tax 
with respect to which the penalty was imposed is also 
nondischargeable (sec 523 (a)(7)) These latter liabilities 
cover those which, but are penal in nature, as distinct 
from so-called "pecuniary loss" penalties which, in the 
case of taxes, involve basically the collection of a tax 
under the label of a "penalty " This provision differs from 
the bill as introduced, which did not link the 
nondischarge of a tax penalty with the treatment of the 
underlying tax The amended provision reflects the 
existing position of the Internal Revenue Service as to tax 
penalties imposed by the Internal Revenue Code 
(RevRul 68-574, 1968-2 C B 595) 
Paragraph (8) follows generally current law and excerpts 
from discharge student loans until such loans have been 
due and owing for five years Such loans include direct 
student loans as well as insured and guaranteed loans 
This provision is intended to be self-executing and the 
lender or institution is not required to file a complaint to 
detennine the nondischargeabihty of any student loan 
Paragraph (9) excepts from discharge debts that the 
debtor owed before a previous bankniptcy case 
concerning the debtor in winch the debtor w as denied a 
discharge other than on the basis of the six-year bar 
Subsection (b) of this section pennits discharge in a 
bankruptcy case of an unscheduled debt fiom a pnor 
case This provision is earned over from Bankruptcy Act 
§ 17b [section 35(b) of fonner title 11] The result 
dictated by the subsection would probably not be 
different if the subsection were not included It is 
included nevertheless for clarity 
Subsection (c) requires a creditor who is owed a debt that 
may be excepted from discharge under paragraph (2), (4), 
or (5), (false statements, defalcation or larceny 
misappropriation, or willful and malicious injury) to 
initiate proceedings m the bankruptcy court for an 
exception to discharge If the creditor does not act, the 
debt is discharged This provision does not change 
current law 
Subsection (d) is new It provides protection to a 
consumer debtor that dealt honestly with a creditor who 
sought to have a debt excepted from discharge on the 
ground of falsity in the incurring of the debt The debtor 
may be awarded costs and a reasonable attorney's fee for 
the proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt 
under subsection (a)(2), if the court finds that the 
proceeding was frivolous or not brought by its creditor in 
good faith 
The purpose of the provision is to discourage creditois 
from initiating proceedings to obtaining a false financial 
statement exception to discharge in the hope of obtaining 
a settlement from an honest debtor anxious to save 
attorney's fees Such practices impair the debtor's fresh 
start and are contrary to the spirit of the bankruptcy laws 
house report no. 95-595 
Subsection (a) lists eight kinds of debts excepted from 
discharge Taxes that are entitled to priority are excepted 
from discharge under paragraph (1) In addition, taxes 
with lespect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return 
or willfully attempted to evade or defeat, or with respect 
to which a return (if required) was not filed or was not 
filed after the due date and after one year before the 
bankruptcy case are excepted from discharge If the 
taxing authority's claim has been disallowed, then it 
would be barred by the more modem rules of collateral 
estoppel from reasserting that claim against the debtor 
after the case was closed See Plumb, The Tax 
Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy 
Laws Tax Procedures, 88 HarvLRev 1360, 1388 
(1975) 
Asunder Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2) [section 35(a)(2) of 
former title 11], debt for obtaining money, property, 
services, or an extension or renewal of credit by false 
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, or by use 
of a statement m writing respecting the debtor's financial 
condition that is materially false, on winch the creditor 
reasonably relied, and that the debtor made or published 
with mtent to deceive, is excepted from discharge Tins 
provision is modified only slightly from current section 
17a (2) First, "actual fraud" is added as a grounds for 
exception from discharge Second, the creditor must not 
only have relied on a false statement in writing, the 
reliance must have been reasonable This codifies case 
law construing this provision Third, the phrase "in any 
manner whatsoever" that appears in current law after 
"made or published" is deleted as unnecessary The word 
"published" is used in the same sense that it is used m 
slander actions 
Unscheduled debts are excepted from discharge under 
paragraph (3) The provision, denved from section 17a 
(3) [section 35(a)(3) of former title 11], follows current 
law, but clarifies some uncertainties generated by the 
case law construing 17a(3) The debt is excepted from 
discharge if it was not scheduled m time to permit timely 
action by the creditor to protect his rights, unless the 
creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case 
Paragraph (4) excepts debts for embezzlement or larceny 
The deletion of willful and malicious conversion from § 
17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act [section 35(a)(2) of former 
title 11 ] is not intended to effect a substantive change 
The intent is to include in the category of 
non-dischargeable debts a conversion under which the 
debtor willfully and maliciously intends to borrow 
property for a short period of time with no intent to inflict 
injury but on which injury is in fact inflicted 
Paragraph (5) excepts from discharge debts to a spouse, 
former spouse, or child of the debtor for alimony to, 
maintenance for, or support of, the spouse or child This 
language, in combination with the repeal of section 
456(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U S C 656 (b)) by 
section 327 of the bill, will apply to make 
nondischargeable only alimony, maintenance, or support 
owed directly to a spouse or dependent See Hearings, pt 
2, at 942 What constitutes alimony, maintenance, or 
support, will be determined under the bankruptcy laws, 
not State law Thus, cases such as In re Waller, 494 F 2d 
447 (6th Cir 1974), Hearings, pt 3, at 1308-10, are 
overruled, and the result in cases such as Fife v Fife, 1 
Utah 2d 281, 265 P 2d 642 (1952) is followed This 
provision will, however, make nondischargeable any 
debts resulting from an agreement by the debtor to hold 
the debtor's spouse harmless on joint debts, to the extent 
that the agreement is in payment of alimony, 
maintenance, or support of the spouse, as determined 
under bankruptcy law considerations that are similar to 
considerations of whether a particular agreement to pay 
money to a spouse is actually alimony or a property 
settlement See Hearings, pt 3, at 1287-1290 
Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious 
injury by the debtor to another person or to the property 
of another person Under this paragraph, "willful" means 
deliberate or intentional To the extent that Tinker v 
Colwell, 193 US 473(1902) [24SCt 505,48 LEd 
754, 11 Am Bankr Rep 568], held that a looser standard 
is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied 
on Tinker to apply a "reckless disregard" standard, they 
are overruled 
Paragraph (7) excepts from discharge a debt for a fine, 
penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a 
governmental unit, that is not compensation for actual 
pecuniary loss 
Paragraph (8) [enacted as (9)] excepts from discharge 
debts that the debtor owed before a previous bankruptcy 
case concerning the debtor in which the debtor was 
demed a discharge other than on the basis of the six-year 
bar 
Subsection (d) is new It provides protection to a 
consumer debtor that dealt honestly with a creditor who 
sought to have a debt excepted from discharge on 
grounds of falsity in the incurring of the debt The debtor 
is entitled to costs of and a reasonable attorney's fee for 
the proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt 
under subsection (a)(2), if the creditor initiated the 
proceeding and the debt was determined to be 
dischargeable The court is permitted to award any actual 
pecuniary loss that the debtor may have suffered as a 
result of the proceeding (such as loss of a day's pay) The 
purpose of the provision is to discourage creditors from 
initiating false financial statement exception to discharge 
actions in the hopes of obtaimng a settlement from an 
honest debtor anxious to save attorney's fees Such 
practices impair the debtor's fresh start 
References in Text 
The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in 
subsec (a), is classified generally to Title 26, Internal 
Revenue Code 
Section 103 of the Truth in Lending Act, referred to in 
subsec (a)(2)(C)(n)(I), is classified to section 1602 of 
Title 15, Commerce and Trade 
The Bankruptcy Act, referred to msubsecs (a)(10) and 
(b), is act July 1, 1898, ch 541, 30 Stat 544, as amended, 
which was classified generally to former Title 11 
Sections 14c and 17a of the Bankruptcy Act were 
classified to sections 32(c) and 35(a) of former Title 11 
Section 408(b)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974, referred to in subsec (a)(18)(A), is 
classified to section 1108 (b)(1) of Title 29, Labor 
Section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
referred to m subsec (a)(19)(A)(i), is classified to section 
78c (a)(47) of Title 15, Commerce and Trade 
Section 439A of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 
referred to m subsec (b), was classified to section 1087-3 
of Title 20, Education, and was repealed by Pub L 
95-598, title III, § 317, Nov 6, 1978, 92 Stat 2678 
Section 733(g) of the Public Health Service Act, referred 
to in subsec (b), was repealed by Pub L 95-598, title III, 
§ 327, Nov 6, 1978, 92 Stat 2679 A subsec (g), 
containing similar provisions, was added to section 733 
by Pub L 97-35, title XXVII, § 2730, Aug 13, 1981, 95 
Stat 919 Section 733 was subsequently omitted m the 
general revision of subchapter V of chapter 6 A of Title 
42, The Public Health and Welfare, by Pub L 102-408, 
title I, §102, Oct 13, 1992, 106 Stat 1994 See section 
292f(g)ofTitle42 
Amendments 
2005-Pub L 109-8, §1209(1), transferred par (15) and 
inserted it after subsec (a)(14A) See 1994 Amendments 
note below 
Pub L 109-8, §215(3), in par (15), inserted "to a 
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor and" before 
"not of the kind" and "or" after "court of record," and 
substituted a semicolon for "unless-
"(A) the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt 
from income or property of the debtor not reasonably 
necessary to be expended for the maintenance or support 
of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor and, if the 
debtor is engaged in a business, for the payment of 
expenditures necessary foi the continuation, preservation, 
and operation of such business, or 
"(B) discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the 
debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to a 
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor," 
Subsec (a) Pub L 109-8, §714(2), inserted at end "For 
purposes of this subsection, the term 'return' means a 
return that satisfies the requirements of applicable 
nonbankruptcy law (including applicable filing 
requirements) Such term includes a return prepared 
pursuant to section 6020(a) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986, or similar State or local law, or a written 
stipulation to a judgment or a final order entered by a 
nonbankruptcy tribunal, but does not include a return 
made pursuant to section 6020(b) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, or a similar State or local law " 
Subsec (a)(1)(A) Pub L 109-8, § 1502(a)(2), substituted 
"507(a)(3)" for "507(a)(2)" 
Subsec (a)(1)(B) Pub L 109-8, §714(1)(A), inserted "or 
equivalent report or notice," after "a return," in 
introductory provisions 
Subsec (a)(l)(B)(i) Pub L 109-8, §714(1 )(B), inserted 
"or given" after "filed" 
Subsec (a)(l)(B)(u) Pub L 109-8, §714(1 )(C), inserted 
"or given" aftei "filed" and ",[ ]report, or notice" after 
"return" 
Subsec (a)(2)(C) Pub L 109-8, §310, amended subpar 
(C) generally Pnoi to amendment, subpar (C) read as 
follows "for purposes of subparagraph (A) of this 
paragraph, consumer debts owed to a single creditor and 
aggregating more than $1,000 for 'luxury goods or 
services' incurred by an individual debtor on or withm 60 
days before the order for relief under this title, or cash 
advances aggregating more than $1,000 that are 
extensions ofconsumei credit under an open end credit 
plan obtained by an individual debtor on or within 60 
days before the order for relief under this title, are 
presumed to be nondischargeable, 'luxury goods or 
services' do not include goods or services reasonably 
acquired for the support or maintenance of the debtor or a 
dependent of the debtor, an extension of consumer credit 
under an open end credit plan is to be defined for 
purposes of this subparagraph as it is defined in the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act," 
Subsec (a)(5) Pub L 109-8, §215(1 )(A), added par (5) 
and struck out former par (5) which read as follows "to a 
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony 
to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in 
connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree 
or other order of a court of record, determination made in 
accordance with State or territorial law by a 
governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but 
not to the extent that-
"(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, 
by operation of law, or otherwise (other than debts 
assigned pursuant to section 408(a)(3) of the Social 
Security Act, or any such debt which has been assigned 
to the Federal Government or to a State or any political 
subdivision of such State), or 
"(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, 
maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually 
in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support," 
Subsec (a)(8) Pub L 109-8, §220, added par (8) and 
struck out former par (8) which read as follows "for an 
educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or 
guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any 
program funded m whole oi m part by a governmental 
unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay 
funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or 
stipend, unless excepting such debt from discharge under 
this paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the 
debtor and the debtor's dependents," 
Subsec (a)(9) Pub L 109-8, §1209(2), substituted 
"motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft" for "motor vehicle" 
Subsec (a)(14A) Pub L 109-8, §314(a), added par 
(14A) 
Subsec (a)(14B) Pub L 109-8, §1235, added par 
(14B) 
Subsec (a)(16) Pub L 109-8, §412, struck out 
"dwelling" after "debtor's interest in a" and "housing" 
after "share of a cooperative" and substituted 
"ownership," for "ownership or" and "or a lot m a 
homeowners association, for as long as the debtor or the 
trustee has a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership 
interest in such unit, such corporation, or such lot," for 
"but only if such fee or assessment is payable for a period 
during which-
"(A) the debtor physically occupied a dwelling unit in the 
condominium or cooperative project, or 
"(B) the debtor rented the dwelling unit to a tenant and 
received payments from the tenant for such period," 
Subsec (a)(17) Pub L 109-8, §301, substituted "on a 
prisoner by any court" for "by a court" and "subsection 
(b) or (f)(2) of section 1915" for "section 1915 (b) or (f)" 
and inserted "(or a similar non-Federal law)" after "title 
28" m two places 
Subsec (a)(18) Pub L 109-8, §224(c), added par (18) 
Pub L 109-8, §215(1 )(B), struck out par (18) which 
read as follows "owed under State law to a State or 
municipality that IS-
"(A) m the nature of support, and 
"(B) enforceable under part D of title IV of the Social 
Security Act (42 U S C 601 et seq ), or" 
Subsec (a)(19)(B) Pub L 109-8, § 1404(a), inserted ",[ 
]before, on, or after the date on which the petition was 
filed," after "results" in introductory provisions 
Subsec (c)(1) Pub L 109-8, §215(2), substituted "or 
(6)" for "(6), or (15)" in two places 
Subsec (e) Pub L 109-8, §1209(3), substituted "an 
insured" for "a insured" 
2002-Subsec (a)(19) Pub L 107-204 added par (19) 
1998-Subsec (a)(8) Pub L 105-244 substituted 
"stipend, unless" for "stipend, unless-" and struck out 
"(B)" before "excepting such debt" and subpar (A) which 
read as follows "such loan, benefit, scholarship, or 
stipend overpayment first became due more than 7 years 
(exclusive of any applicable suspension of the repayment 
period) before the date of the filing of the petition, or" 
1996-Subsec (a)(5)(A) Pub L 104-193, §374(a)(4), 
substituted "section 408 (a)(3)" for "section 402 (a)(26)" 
Subsec (a)(17) Pub L 104-134 added par (17) 
Subsec (a)(18) Pub L 104-193, §374(a)(l)-(3), added 
par (18) 
1994-Par (15) Pub L 103-394, §304(e)[(l)], amended 
this section by adding par (15) at the end See 2005 
Amendment note above 
Subsec (a) Pub L 103-394, §501(d)(13)(A)(i), 
substituted "1141," for "1141,," m introductory 
provisions 
Subsec (a)(1)(A) Pub L 103-394, §304(h)(3), 
substituted "507(a)(8)" for "507(a)(7)" 
Subsec (a)(2)(C) Pub L 103-394, §§306, 501 
(d)(13)(A)(n), substituted "$1,000 for" for "$500 for", 
"60" for "forty" after "incurred by an individual debtor on 
or within", and "60" for "twenty" after "obtained by an 
individual debtor on or within", and struck out "(15 
U S C 1601 et seq )" after "Protection Act" 
Subsec (a)(ll) Pub L 103-322, §320934(1), struck out 
"or" after semicolon at end 
Subsec (a)(12) Pub L 103-322, §320934(2), which 
directed the substitution of",[ ]or" for a period at end of 
par (12), could not be executed because a period did not 
appear at end 
Subsec (a)(13) Pub L 103-394, §221(1), substituted 
semicolon for period at end 
Pub L 103-322, §320934(3), added par (13) 
Subsec (a)(14) Pub L 103-394, §221(2), added par 
(14) 
Subsec (a)(16) Pub L 103-394, §309, added par (16) 
Subsec (b) Pub L 103-394, §501 (d)(l3)(B), struck out 
"(20 U S C 1087-3)" after "Act of 1965" and "(42 U S C 
294f)" after "Service Act" 
Subsec (c)(1) Pub L 103-394, §304(e)(2), substituted 
"(6), or (15)" foi "or (6)" in two places 
Subsec (e) Pub L 103-394, §50l(d)(13)(C), substituted 
"insured depository institution" for "depository institution 
or insured credit union" 
1990-Subsec (a)(8) Pub L 101-647, §3621, substituted 
"for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, 
insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made 
under any program funded in whole or m part by a 
governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for an 
obligation to repay funds received as an educational 
benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless" for "for an 
educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a 
governmental unit, or made under any program funded m 
whole or in part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit 
institution, unless" m introductory provisions and 
amended subpar (A) generally Prior to amendment, 
subpar (A) read as follows "such loan first became due 
before five years (exclusive of any applicable suspension 
of the repayment period) before the date of the filing of 
the petition, or" 
Subsec (a)(9) Pub L 101-581 and Pub L 101-647, 
§3102(a), identically amended par (9) generally Prior to 
amendment, par (9) lead as follows "to any entity, to the 
extent that such debt arises from a judgment or consent 
decree entered in a court of record against the debtor 
wherein liability was incurred by such debtoi as a result 
of the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle while legally 
intoxicated undei the laws or regulations of any 
jurisdiction within the United States or its territories 
wherein such motor vehicle was operated and witlnn 
which such liability was incurred, or" 
Subsec (a)(ll), (12) Pub L 101-647, §2522(a)(l), 
added pars (11) and (12) 
Subsec (c) Pub L 101-647, §2522(a)(3), designated 
existing provisions as par (1) and added par (2) 
Subsec (e) Pub L 101-647, §2522(a)(2), added subsec 
(e) 
1986-Subsec (a) Pub L 99-554, § 257(n), inserted 
reference to sections 1228 (a) and 1228 (b) of tins title 
Subsec (a)(1)(A) Pub L 99-554, § 283ij)(l)(A), 
substituted "507(a)(7)" for "507(a)(6)" 
Subsec (a)(5) Pub L 99-554, § 281, struck out the 
comma after "decree" and inserted ",[ ]detennmation 
made in accordance with State or territorial law by a 
governmental unit," after "record" 
Subsec (a)(9), (10) Pub L 99-554, § 283(j)(l)(B), 
redesignated par (9) relating to debts incurred by persons 
driving while intoxicated, added by Pub L 98-353, as 
(10) 
Subsec (b) Pub L 99-554, § 283(j)(2), substituted 
"Service" for "Services" 
1984-Subsec (a)(2) Pub L 98-353, § 454(a)(1), in 
provisions preceding subpar (A), struck out "obtaining" 
after "for", and substituted "refinancing of credit, to the 
extent obtained" for "refinance of credit," 
Subsec (a)(2)(A) Pub L 98-353, § 307(a)(1), struck out 
"or" at end 
Subsec (a)(2)(B) Pub L 98-353, § 307(a)(2), inserted 
"or" at end 
Subsec (a)(2)(B)(in) Pub L 98-353, § 454(a)(1)(A), 
struck out "obtaining" before "such" 
Subsec (a)(2)(C) Pub L 98-353, § 307(a)(3), added 
subpar (C) 
Subsec (a)(5) Pub L 98-353, § 454(b)(1), inserted "or 
other order of a court of record" after "divorce decree," in 
provisions preceding subpar (A) 
Subsec (a)(5)(A) Pub L 98-353, § 454(b)(2), inserted 
",[ ]or any such debt winch has been assigned to the 
Federal Government or to a State or any political 
subdivision of such State" 
Subsec (a)(8) Pub L 98-353, §§371(1), 454(a)(2), 
struck out "of higher education" after "a nonprofit 
institution of and struck out "or" at end 
Subsec (a)(9) Pub L 98-353, § 371(2), added the par 
(9) relating to debts incurred by persons driving while 
intoxicated 
Subsec (c) Pub L 98-353, § 454(c), inserted "of a kind" 
after "debt" 
Subsec (d) Pub L 98-353, § 307(b), substituted "the 
court shall grant judgment in favor of the debtor for the 
costs of, and a reasonable attorney's fee for, the 
proceeding if the court finds that the position of the 
creditor was not substantially justified, except that the 
court shall not award such costs and fees if special 
circumstances would make the award unjust" for "the 
court shall grant judgment against such creditor and m 
favor of the debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable 
attorney's fee for, the proceeding to determine 
dischargeability, unless such granting of judgment would 
be clearly inequitable" 
1981-Subsec (a)(5)(A) Pub L 97-35 substituted "law, 
or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to 
section 402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act)," for "law, 
or otherwise," 
1979-Subsec (a)(8) Pub L 96-56 substituted "for an 
educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a 
governmental unit, or made under any program funded in 
whole or in part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit 
institution of higher education" for "to a governmental 
unit, or a nonprofit institution of higher education, for an 
educational loan" in the provisions preceding subpar (A) 
and inserted "(exclusive of any applicable suspension of 
the repayment period)" after "before five years" in 
subpar (A) 
Effective Date of 2005 Amendment 
Pub L 109-8, title XIV, §1404(b),Apr 20,2005, 119 
Stat 215, provided that "The amendment made by 
subsection (a) [amending tins section] is effective 
beginning July 30, 2002 " 
Amendment by sections 215, 220, 224(c), 301, 310, 
314(a), 412, 714, 1209, 1235, and 1502(a)(2) of Pub L 
109-8 effective 180 days after Apr 20,2005, and not 
applicable with respect to cases commenced under this 
title before such effective date, except as otherwise 
provided, see section 1501 of Pub L 109-8, set out as a 
note under section 101 of this title 
Effective Date of 1998 Amendment 
Pub L 105-244, title IX, §971(b), Oct 7,1998, 112 
Stat 1837, provided that "The amendment made by 
subsection (a) [amending tins section] shall apply only 
with respect to cases commenced under title 11, United 
States Code, after the date of enactment of this Act [Oct 
7,1998]" 
Effective Date of Amendment 
Section 374(c) of Pub| 
amendments made by 
and section 656 of 
Welfare] shall appl)| 
commenced under title 
the date of the enactmeht 
L 104-193 provided that "The 
tjhis section [amending this section 
Title 42, The Public Health and 
only with respect to cases 
11 of the United States Code after 
ofthisAct[Aug 22,1996] " 
For provisions relating Ito effective date of title III of Pub 
L 104-193, see sectiol 395 (a)-(c) of Pub L 104-193, 
set out as a note under Section 654 of Title 42, The Public 
Health and Welfare 
Effective Date of 19941 Amendment 
Amendment by Pub L 103-394 effective Oct 22,1994, 
and not applicable w|th respect to cases commenced 
under this title before t>ct 22, 1994, see section 702 of 
Pub L 103-394, set o^ it as a note under section 101 of 
this title 
Effective Date of 1990| Amendments 
Section 3104 of title X|XXI of Pub L 101-647 provided 
that 
"(a) Effective Date -This title and the amendments made 
by this title [amending this section and section 1328 of 
this title and enacting provisions set out as a note under 
section 101 of this titlel shall take effect on the date of 
the enactment oftlnsAtt [Nov 29, 1990] 
"(b) Application of Amjendments 
by this title [amending| 
this title] shall not 
commenced under 
before the date of the 
The amendments made 
this section and section 1328 of 
apply with respect to cases 
11 of the United States Code 
enactment of tins Act" 
titte 
Amendment by section 
180 days after Nov 29 J 
101-647, set out as an 
3001 ofTitle28,Judicikry 
3621 of Pub L 101-647 effective 
1990, see section 3631 of Pub L 
(Effective Date note under section 
and Judicial Procedure 
Section 4 of Pub L 10J-5 81 provided that 
"(a) Effective Date -Thj 
by this Act [amending 
lis Act and the amendments made 
J this section and section 1328 of 
this title and enacting provisions set out as a note under 
section 101 of this title] shall take effect on the date of 
the enactment of tins A^t [Nov 15, 1990] 
"(b) Application of Amf 
by this Act [amending 
this title] shall not 
commenced under titl^ 
before the date of the 
sndments -The amendments made 
tins section and section 1328 of 
apply with respect to cases 
11 of the United States Code 
eiiactment of this Act" 
Effective Date of 1986 (Amendment 
Amendment by section 257 of Pub L 99-554 effective 
30 days after Oct 27, 1986, but not applicable to cases 
commenced under this title before that date, see section 
302(a), (c)(1) of Pub L 99-554, set out as a note under 
section 581 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure 
Amendment by sections 281 and 283 of Pub L 99-554 
effective 30 days after Oct 27, 1986, see section 302(a) 
of Pub L 99-554 
Effective Date of 1984 Amendment 
Amendment by Pub L 98-353 effective with respect to 
cases filed 90 days aftei July 10,1984, see section 552(a) 
of Pub L 98-353, set out as a note under section 101 of 
this title 
Effective Date of 1981 Amendment 
Amendment by Pub L 97-35 effective Aug 13,1981, 
see section 2334(c) of Pub L 97-35, set out as a note 
under section 656 of Title 42, The Public Health and 
Welfare 
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JN THE UNITED STATES BANICRUPTCY 
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 
In Re: 
THOMAS R KEETCH and 
TERfL. KEETCH, 
Debtors. 
PAUt A. TIMOTHY and JANfCE 
1 h\'(OTHYr husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs. 
THOMAS R. KEETCH and 
TERI L. KEETCH, 
Defendants. 
NO. 2:07-bk-02532-SSC 
(Chapter 7) 
Adv. No. 2:07-ap-00509-SSC 
DEBTOR'S MEMORANDUM OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Thomas R. Keetch and Teri Keetch, s 
Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motior 
bmil the following Memorandum of Points and 
for Summary Judgment. 
1 
Plaintiffs use as a factual basis for their Memorandum the Findings of the Fouith Judicial 
District Court for Utah County, The Statement of Facts does not identify the undcilying 
evidence from which the Findings and Conclusions are derived. 
Defendants cannot deny that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw are in fact the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Court and consequently cannot deny the 
Statement of Facts as presented because they arc the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of 
the District Court. 
The Ruling of Judge Laycock is presently on appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals (See 
attached Notice) If this Court is merely going to adopt the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law from the District Court in Utah, then the Court should defer its determination until the 
completion of the appeal in Utah. 
On the other hand, if this Court is making a de novo determination of the matter, then the 
Statement of Facts to this Court^should be based upon the actual testimony of the witnesses and 
this Court should make its own determinations or to have a separate trial where evidence is 
taken. 
The Defendants Statement of Facts contains the actual deposition or trial testimony 
pertinent to the issue of fraud. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Attached hereto is a copy of the Amended Complaint fded by the Plaintiffs. 
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2. Paragraph 13 sets out three claims which form the basis for Plaintiffs allegation 
for fraud as follows: 
13. On or before September 28, 2001, Defendants made certain false 
representations to the Plaintiffs as hereinafter set forth: 
a. That the Keetches would pledge to the Plaintiffs the horse called 
"Hcsa Son of a Dun" as collateral for the aforementioned loan; and 
b. That the Keetches would use all of the monies received from the 
loan to purchase additional horses; and 
c. That Hesa Son of a Dun was free and clear of all liens and 
encumbrances and could be used by the Defendants as collateral for the 
aforementioned loan. 
Judge Laycock specifically ruled that the basis for Plaintiffs claim for fraud was limited 
only to the issues raised in paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint subparagraphs a, b, and c. 
The Plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence with regard to the filing of a bankruptcy as an 
additional claim for fraud. Counsel for Defendant objected on the basis of relevancy because 
that issue had not been pled and the Court ruled as follows: 
THE COURT: In looking at the amended 
compliant in the fraud claim, paragraph 13, it reads, "On or before 
September 28,2001, the defendants made certain false 
representations to the Plaintiff as hereafter set forth. A, that the 
Keetches would pledge to Plaintiffs the horse Pie's a Son of a Dim 
as collateral for the aforementioned loan; and B that the Keetches 
would use all moneys received from the loan to purchase 
additional horses; and, C, that He's a Son of a Dun was free and 
clear of all liens and encumbrances and could be used by the 
Defendants for the aforementioned loan." 
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The statute - Pm sorry - the rule, in the rule of 
civil procedure, allows notice pleading, which means you can 
generally put the other side on notice as to what the claims are 
except for fraud, which has to be plead with particularity, as has 
noted by both parties here in their arguments. And I think what 
that means is that to at trial marshal all the evidence that you can 
about anything that might be fraudulently said is an unfair attack by 
the Plaintiff, because the requirement is that the statements be 
pleaded with particularity so the other side does have notice. 
And so I think the case, the plaintiffs' case is 
limited to the three claims that are made under 13 - paragraph 13 
in the amended complaint. So I agree. I sustain the objection. 
See T: page 57 line 2 to page 58 line 1. 
3. At the time the parties entered into the Promissory Note, there was a UCC 
financing statement recorded with the State of Utah evidencing the existing lien on Hesa Son of a 
Dun. (See paragraph 14 of Plaintiff s Amended Complaint attached. Said allegation was 
admitted in Respondent's answer.) 
4, The Timothys failed to search the UCC records for liens prior to completing the 
Q: So I take it if you didn't know what it was at the 
time you did not check to see if there was a UCC filing? 
A: We did not. 
T: page 392 line 2 to 4 
5. Paul Timothy conceded that the representation in the amended complaint 
paragraph 13 subparagraph "b" was never made. Specifically Mr. Timothy testified as follows: 
Q: So what you are saying is that Teri never 
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represented to you that she would use the money received from the 
loan to purchase additional horses? 
A. She said to save the horses. 
Q. She never told you that the purpose of the moneys 
received would be, from the loan, would be to purchase additional 
horses? 
A. Save the horses, whatever that meant. 
Q: Let me be specific. Is your testimony, did Teri ever 
represent to you that the money received from the loan was to 
purchase additional horses. 
A: I never heard that. 
See T: page 411 line 14 to line 25 
6. As it relates to paragraph 13(a) of the amended complaint, not only does the 
allegation refer to an event in the future and consequently there could be no present intent to 
defraud or an existing fact but more importantly the Plaintiffs made no effort after the signing of 
the note to create a security interest in the horse. Mr. Timothy testified as follows: 
Q: There was a period of time between this promissory note 
and the time you found out that He's a Son of a Dun was collateral 
and had been taken. Is that fair? 
A; There was a gap there where we did not know he had been 
previously collateralized? Is that your question? 
Q: Right. 
A: The answer is yes. 
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Q: And during [hat period of time did you make any efforts to 
secure a security interest in He's a Son of a Dun? 
A: No. 
T: Page 434 line 22 to page 435 line 6, 
7. In the months prior to entering into the Promissory Note between the parties, the 
Defendants Ten and Thomas Keetch (hereinafter the Keetches) had been working with a loan 
broker namely Rebecca Mendenhall in order to purchase (along with other investors) a 
therapeutic horse ranch. T: page 437 line 18 to page 440 line 25. Also T: 442 line 20 to page 
444 line 25. 
8. For several months prior to the signing of the Promissory Note, the Keetches had 
looked at potential properties to purchase, had submitted financial information both for the 
Keetches and other partners to Rebecca Mendenhall and had provided any and all infomiation 
that Becky Mendenhall had requested for purposes of finding long term financing for the 
therapeutic horse ranch. T: page 445 line 19 to page 446 line 10. 
9. Rebecca Mendenhall came to the Keetches and informed them that she had a 
client namely Paul and Janice Timothy (hereinafter Timothys) who would be willing to provide a 
bridge loan to the Keetches and assured the Keetches that the long term financing had been 
approved and that the bridge loan from the Timothys would be repaid out of the long term 
financing;. T: 446 lines 11 to 447 line 1. 
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10. Paul Timothy testified at trial that they entered into the loan with the Keetchcs 
based upon the assurance from Rebecca Mendcnhall that the long term financing would be 
available to repay the bridge loan. T: 422 lines 12 to 18. 
11. Becky Mendcnhall brokered and negotiated the terms of the loan directly with the 
Timothys. T: 452 lines 20 to 454 Line 18. 
12. Rebecca Mendenhall was the one who drafted the Promissory Note. T: page 454 
lines 19 to 23. 
13. There was only one occasion wherein Teri Keetch had direct contact with either of 
the Plaintiffs which was a meeting at McDonalds in Lehi, Utah, the details of the discussion will 
be discussed in detail later herein. T: Page 449 line 15 to page 450 line 5. Also T; page 409 lines 
5 to 8. 
14. There was only one occasion in which Thomas Keetch had contact with the 
Timothys which occurred on the day of closing at Becky Mendenhalfs office for the purpose of 
signing the Promissory Note and exchanging money. T: page 409 lines 9 to 12. 
15. The Court does not make separate findings of the evidence relating to Thomas 
Keetch as opposed to the evidence relating to Teri Keetch, yet the Court should have entered 
findings regarding each of the elements of fraud as it relates to the defendants separately. (See 
Findings of Fact submitted by the Petitioner with their Motion for Summary Judgment) 
16. The Findings and Conclusions make some reference to an agency relationship 
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between Thomas ICeetch and Teri ICeetch, yet an agency responsibility for fraud was not pled. 
(See attached Complaint) 
17. Both Thomas Keetch and Rebecca Mendenhall testified at Tnal that the issue of 
whether Hesa Son of a Dun was free and clear of all liens and encumbrances and could be used 
by Defendants as collateral was never discussed at the time the paitties signed the closing 
documents. T: page 50 line 23 to page 51 line 6. Also T: page 34$ lines 13 to 24. 
18. Janice Timothy (one of the Plaintiffs herein) testified at her deposition as 
follows: 
Q: Well, I'm trying to sort out what was represented by Tom versus 
what was represented by Becky. 
A: Well, I don't remember specific conversations, you know, he said, 
she said. But we were all their together. We went over ever 
agreement to everything she was saying. I mean there wasn 
oh, we had this horse already collateralized or we have really had a bankruptcy or 
were in bankruptcy or anything. None of that ever came up. (See deposition of 
Janice Timothy page 26 lines 12-22) 
ything, and he was in 
I't any discussion that, 
19. At Trial Janice Timothy stated: 
Q: In that conversation was anything mentioned about 
whether or not they owned He's a Son of a Dim, and ([ say "they" 
Tom and Ten owned He's a son of a Dun free and clear, or 
whether or not they had posted He's a Son of a Dun ^s collateral to 
another person? 
A: It was always implied that he was fred and clear. 
There was never any mention of him being collateralized or there 
was no way I would have signed this. 
T: page 280 lines 11 to 18 
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Later Ms. Timothy also testified: 
Q: On September 28, 2001, did you discuss with Tom whether or not he had 
ever declared bankruptcy or whether he was in bankruptcy? 
A: No, I did not. 
T: page 281 line 23 to page 282 line 1 
20. The Court found pursuant to Finding 11: 
Paul and Janice Timothy also testified. There were small conflicts in their 
testimony. None of those conflicts were material to the outcome of the case. The 
Court finds that the conflicts were justified in the length of time that had accrued 
since the events giving rise to the lawsuit and the Trial. Although the Timothys' 
memory may have faded to some extent, they were both credible witnesses, (see 
Finding #11) 
21. Clearly if the Court found that Janice Timothy was a credible witness, then her 
testimony exonerates Thomas Keetch from any fraudulent representation because Janice Timothy 
was present in the very meeting and only meeting with Thomas Keetch wherein Paul Timothy 
alleges the misrepresentation to have occurred. 
22. No where in the Findings or Conclusions does the Court reconcile the clear 
inconsistency between the testimony of Paul Timothy and Janice Timothy, yet at the same time 
finds them both to be credible witnesses. 
23. Mr. Timothy testified at his deposition as follows: 
Q: If I asked you what a purchase money security interest is, could you 
tell me? 
A: Wouldn't have a clue. 
Q: Do you have any idea how to create a security interest in a horse? 
A: Apparently not. 
[deposition of Paul Timothy, P. 10, L. 20-25] 
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24. Even though Mr. Timothy did not even know that it was possible that a lien could 
be placed on a horse, he somehow had the wherewithal to apparently ask and receive a 
representation horn Thomas Keetch that there were no liens against the horse and that Hesa Son 
of a Dun could be placed as collateral. (See Findings of the Utah Court) 
25. The single occasion in which Teri Keetch had contact with the Plaintiff was a 
contact only between Teri Keetch and Paul Timothy which occurred in the days just prior to the 
signing of the Promissory Note. T: Page 449 line 15 to page 450 line 5. Also T; page 409 lines 5 
to 8. 
26. At the time of the meeting the Timothys resided in Pleasant Grove; the Keetches 
resided in Salt Lake County and Hesa Son of a Dun was stabled in Lehi, Utah, i.e. Utah County. 
Rebecca Mendenhall's office also was located in Salt Lake County. 
27. Teri Keetch received a phone call from Rebecca Mendenhall who indicated that 
she did not have time to meet with Paul Timothy to show him where Hesa Son of a Dun was 
located and asked Teri Keetch if she could meet Mr. Timothy at the McDonalds in Lehi, Utah, 
and then have him follow her to the location of the horse. T: page 450 lines 8 to 18. 
28. Although the parties' testimony with regard to what occurred at the meetmg 
differs substantially, not only in the length of the meeting, what was discussed in the meeting but 
even as to whether the parties ate lunch together. Teri Keetch contends that the issue of any liens 
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against the horse or money owed on Hesa Son of a Dun was never raised or discussed in the 
meeting that those were all issues resolved between Mr, Timothy and their broker Becky 
Mendenhall. T: page 453 line 17 to page 454 line 21. 
29. Teri Keetch contends that Becky Mendenhall was well aware of the UCC filing on 
Hesa Son of a Dun because she had informed Becky Mendenhall of the UCC filing and that it 
was Becky Mendenhall who was negotiating the terms of the agreement on behalf of the 
Keetches. T: page 442 line 20 to page 445 tine 2. 
30. The Timothys at no time made efforts to obtain credit reports for Tom and/or Teri 
Keetch; to search bankruptcy records to determine if a bankruptcy by either of them had been 
filed at any point in time; at no time did the Timothys ask for financial statements or any loan 
application documentation regarding credit worthiness. T: page 433 lines 10 to page 434 line 21 
POINT I 
THE TIMOTHYS WERE IMPARTED CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF 
THE LIENS AGAINST HESA SON OF A DUN BASED UPON THE UCC 
FILINGS ON RECORD WITH THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The Utah Supreme Court in J.R. Simplot Company, et aL v. Sales King International., et 
ah, 17 P.3d 1100 (Utah 2000) set out the standard with regard to the notice that is provided by 
filing a UCC filing statement with the Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. 
The Utah Supreme Court ruled as follows: 
I. SECURITY INTERESTS 
[*P14] Part of the underlying purpose of the UCC is to 
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"simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial 
transactions.'' Utah Code Amu § 70/1-1-102(2) {\991)\ see also 
InsleyMfg. Corp. v. Draper Batik & Trust, 717 P. 2d 1341, 1346 
(Utah 1986) (noting that "[a] secured party should be able to rely 
on his compliance with the Code's requirements for perfection"); 
79 C.J.S. 'Secured Transactions § 2 (1995) (stating that the code's 
"general purpose is to create a precise guide for commercial 
transactions under which businessmen may predict with confidence 
the results of their dealings"). Furthermore, "the fundamental 
purpose of Article 9[4 ] is to give notice to third persons and 
simplify the filing process." 9 Ronald A. Anderson & Laiy 
Lawrence, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial [***9] Code § 
401:5, at 483 (3d ed. rev. 1999); see also Insley, 717 P.2d at 1345 
("The purpose and concept of notice filing would be significantly 
weakened if we held that [the party] is not bound by that which it 
would have discovered through a proper inquiry."); 79 C J.S. 
supra, § 53, at 438 (stating that purpose of filing includes 
protection of creditor "by furnishing to others intending to enter 
into a transaction with the debtor a starting point for investigation 
which will result in fair warning with respect to the transaction 
contemplated"). As such, a party who has secured its interest in 
accordance with article 9 has priority, upon a debtor's default, 
"over 'anyone anywhere, anyhow' except as otherwise provided by 
the remaining Code priority rules," Insley, 717 P. 2d at 1347 
(quoting Continental [**1105] Am, Life Ins, Co. v. Griffin, 251 
Ga. 412, 306S.E.2d285, 287 (Ga. 1983)); see also Anderson & 
Lawrence, supra, § 9-312:6, at 330 (noting that conflicts of 
security interests are determined exclusively by article 9). 
If the court determines that the information contained within the UCC filing provides 
constructive notice then the Timothy's fraud claim fails in its entirety. The only viable fraud 
claim the Timothy's have is the claim that the Keetches represented that "Hesa Son of a Dun was 
free and clear of all liens and encumbrances and could be used by the defendants as collateral for 
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the loan." 
The Plaintiffs acknowledged the existence of the UCC filing and the associated notice of 
the lien in their Amended Complaint. (See (^14). 
If the Timothy's had constructive notice then the credibility of the witnesses becomes 
immaterial 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINED THAT THE TIMOTHYS WERE 
NOT BOUND BY THE NOTICE GIVEN BY THE UCC FILING BECAUSE 
THE TIMOTHYS WERE UNAWARE OF THE PROVISIONS 
CONTAINED IN THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. 
The Trial Court in reaching its conclusion relied upon Robinson v. Tripco, 21 P.3d 219 
(Utah App. 2000) which is a BFtah Court of Appeals case wherein the Court of Appeals stated, 
To determine whether the reliance was reasonable, the reliance 'must be 
considered with reference to the facts of each case5 Condor 739 P.2 638. In 
general, a Plaintiff may justifiably rely on a positive assertions of fact without 
independent investigation. It is only where, under the circumstances, the facts 
should make it apparent to one of his knowledge and intelligence, or he has 
discovered something which should serve as a warning that he is being deceived, 
that a Plaintiff is required to make his own investigation. 
The Trial Court concluded based upon the foregoing that the reasonable reliance prong 
was a "subjective" analysis of what the Timothys actually knew and because the Timothys were 
unaware of the Uniform Commercial Code provisions that they were not bound by the 
constructive notice nor did the Timothys have an obligation to search the UCC filings to 
determine whether there were any liens. 
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The foregoing analysis should be balanced in light of other cases and in fact the very next 
paragraph in the Robinson case, the Court of Appeals stated; 
id (citations admitted). In addition, fraud as relates to the purchase of real 
estate may not be predicated on alleged false statements the truth of which could 
have been ascertained with reasonable diligence by the party asserting their 
falsity" Maach v. Resource Design and Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570 577 
(Utah Ct.App. 1994). See Robinson at p. 225. 
It is clear that the Court in Robinson intended that at least in the context of a real estate 
transaction that a party would be bound by the information obtained from a County Recorder. 
It is not a pioper excuse or defense by a party to say that because 1 was unaware of a 
statutory provision that I am not bound by its provision. Mr. Timothy was a sophisticated person 
in the area of contracts. His employment for much of his life was negotiating labor contracts on 
behalf of large corporations and further both Mr. and Mrs. Timothy had their real estate licenses 
which would make them aware of recording and notice details at least in the area of real estate 
transactions. It is not a defense to a criminal prosecution to come before the Court and say that I 
was not aware that certain conduct was illegal and therefore I should not be prosecuted. It would 
not be proper for the Keetches to come before this Court and say that because they were unaware 
that a fraud claim was nondischargeable in bankruptcy that we are not bound by those statutory 
provisions. 
The Timothys should not be allowed to assert that because they did not know about the 
notice imparted by the UCC filings that they are not bound by the notice requirements. 
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Interestingly even the Judge in rendering her opinion appeared to justi fy the Timothys defense by 
asserting that until this case she was unaware that a security interest could be obtained on a horse 
through a (JCC filing. The Judge in her ruling stated: 
... Mr. Timothy had done some of their own investigation. As 
horse owners they had some knowledge. Apparently, they didn't 
know that you could file on a UCC ~ do a UCC filing on a horse, 
didn't know what a UCC filing was; and frankly, until last 
Thursday neither did I. It never occurred to me that you could do a 
UCC filing on a living animal. 
T: page 561 lines 2 to 7. 
There are a number of other cases which give clarification to the reasonable reliance 
prong as follows: The Utah Supreme Court in Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Company, 915 
P.2d 1060 (Utah 1996) stated: 
No matter how naive and inexperienced the Defendants were, they could 
not close their eyes and accept unquestionably any representations made to them, 
It was their duty to make such investigation and inquiry as reasonable care under 
the circumstances would dictate .... The one who complains of being injured by 
such a false representation cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever is told him 
but has the duty of exercising such a degree of care to protect his own interest as 
would be exercised by an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person under the 
circumstances; and if he fails to do so, is precluded from holding someone else to 
account for the consequences of his own neglect. 
It is apparent from the above citation that it is not a subjective analysis of what the 
Timothys actually did or did not know but rather an objective analysis of what an ordinary 
reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances would have done. 
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The Court of Appeals in Maach v. Resource Design and Construction, fac., 875 P.2d 570 
(UlahApp. 1994) stated: 
Although the Klas opinion focused on the issue of unilateral 
mistake, this court further determined that the defendants' 
counterclaim for fraud and misrepresentation was properly 
dismissed: 
In light of our determination that defendants' conduct did not rise 
to the level of ordinary diligence, it follows that the trial court 
correctly dismissed defendants' counterclaim for fraud and 
misrepresentation. "Fraud as related [**17] to purchase of real 
estate may not be predicated on alleged false statements the truth of 
which could have been ascertained with reasonable diligence by 
the party asserting their falsity." Sokolosky v. Tulsa Orthopaedic, 
Inc. Pension Trust, 566 PM 429, 431 (Old. 1977) (quoting Onstott 
v. Osborne, 417 P,2d 291, 293 (Old. 1966)). Defendants could 
have ascertained with reasonable diligence the truth or falsity of 
Carol Klas's alleged misrepresentations by requesting copies of 
the appraisals, or demanding to laiow the basis for her 
information, or by obtaining an independent appraisal of the 
subject property prior to executing the agreement. Since the means 
of knowledge were available to defendants and since they failed to 
avail themselves of these means, they cannot now claim to have 
been deceived by the representations of the vendor. See SokolosJcy, 
566P.2dat431. 
829 P.2d at 141 n.9 (emphasis added). 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not included due diligence 
as an element of negligent misrepresentation, it has required a 
somewhat analagous element of "reasonable reliance." [*"H18] See 
Price-Orem, 713 P.2d at 59 (negligent misrepresentation requires 
reasonable reliance by injured party). 5 Therefore, in order to 
successfully bring an action for negligent misrepresentation, the 
Maacks must demonstrate that they at least took reasonable steps to 
ascertain the truth of Kesselring's representation that there was a one-
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year builder's warranty, or, worded differently, that the Maacks' 
reliance on Kesselring's statement without some further inquiry was 
reasonable under the circumstances. 
The Court requires an objective standard of what a reasonable person would 
have done under the circumstances. 
POINT III 
AS IT RELATES TO THE ALLEGED 
MISREPRESENTATION BY THOMAS KEETCH, THE 
COURT CANNOT FIND THAT BOTH MRS. TIMOTHY AND 
MR. TIMOTHY ARE CREDIBLE WITNESSES. 
The Utah District Court made the following Findings of Fact contained in 
paragraph 11 which reads: 
Paul and Janice Timothy also testified. There were some 
small conflicts in their testimony. None of those conflicts were 
material to the outcome of the case. The Court finds that the conflicts 
were justified in the length of time that has accrued since the events 
giving rise to this lawsuit and the Trial. Although the Timothys 
memories may have faded to some extent, they are both credible 
witnesses. 
As set out in the Statement of Facts, Mr. Timothy admitted that subparagraph 13 (b) of 
the Amended Complaint which claimed "that the Keetches would use all of the money received 
from the loan to purchase additional horses was inaccurate and not a representation that he made, 
See paragraph 5 of he State of Facts above. 
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Likewise subparagraph 13 (a) the Amended Complaint which slates: That the 
Keetches would pledge to Plaintiffs5 horse called Hesa Son of a Dun as collateral for the 
aforementioned loan docs not provide a basis for fraud in that it is a statement as to what they 
would do in the future, i.e. not a presently existing fact and in fact the Keetches did pledge Hesa 
Son of a Dun as collateral although the Timothys never attempted to perfect a security interest in 
the horse. 
The single remaining issue upon which fraud is claimed by the Timothys is on the issue 
of whether Hesa Son of a Dun was free and clear of all liens and encumbrances and could be 
used by the Defendants as collateral for the aforementioned loan. 
The only time that Janice Timothy had contact with either of the Defendants was at the 
closing and Tom Keetch was the only Defendant that was present. Mr. Timothy testified that 
Thomas Keetch represented that Hesa Son of Dun was free and clear of all liens and 
encumbrances. 
Thomas Keetch, Rebecca Mendenhall and Mrs. Timothy all testified that in the meeting 
where the contract was signed that there was no discussion regarding a representation that Hesa 
Son of a Dun was held free and clear and there were no liens against the horse. 
At deposition, Janice Timothy testified as follows: 
Q: Well, I'm trying to sort out what was represented by Tom versus 
what was represented by Becky. 
A: Well, I don't remember specific conversations, you know, he said, 
she said. But we were all their together. We went over everything, and he was in 
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agreement to everything she was saying. [ mean there wasn't any discussion that, 
oh, we had this horse already collateralized or we have really had a bankruptcy or 
were in bankruptcy or anything. None of that ever came up. (See deposition of 
Janice Timothy page 26 lines 12-22) 
At Trial Janice Timothy stated: 
Q: In that conversation was anything mentioned about 
whether or not they owned He's a Son of a Dun, and I say "they" 
Tom and Ten owned Pie's a son of a Dun free and clear, or 
whether or not they had posted He's a Son of a Dun as collateral to 
another person? 
A: It was always implied that he was free and clear. 
There was never any mention of him being collateralized or there 
was no way I would have signed this. 
T:page280 lines 11 to 18 
Later Ms. Timothy also testified: 
Q: On September 28, 2001, did you discuss with Tom whether or not he had 
ever declared bankruptcy or whether he was in bankruptcy? 
A: No, I did not. 
T: page 281 line 23 to page 282 line 1 
Becky Mendenhall (the broker) testified at Trial as follows: 
Q: During the day of the closing do you recall 
any conversations that occurred with regard to whether the 
Keetches had filed bankruptcy? 
A: There were no conversations as far as 
a bankruptcy being filed. 
Q: Was there any conversations on that 
day with regard to the credit worthiness of the 
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Keetches? 
A: No. 
Q: Was there any discussion on that day 
whether Hesa Son of a Dun had been collateralized 
as part of a separate loan? 
A There was no discussion. 
T: page 348 lines 13 to 24 
The difference in testimony was not a minor discrepancy between the parties. Paul 
Timothy specifically testified that a representation was made by Tom Keetch at closing, that the 
horses were free and clear and could be used as collateral for the loan. Janice Timothy testified 
just the opposite saying that issue was never discussed. If the issue was never discussed, then 
there was no representation made by Thomas Keetch and consequently no misrepresentation. 
Although it was not properly pled as part of the Amended Complaint, Mr. Paul Timothy 
specifically testified that he asked if Tom Keetch had filed bankmptcy yet his wife Janice 
Timothy testified that the issues was never discussed with Tom Keetch at the closing. 
If the Court determined that Janice Timothy's testimony was credible and that the issue of 
collateral and bankmptcy was never discussed at the closing, then it would also tend to discredit 
Mr, Timothy's testimony that in his one on one meeting with Ten! Keetch, that maybe Tern 
Keetch was more credible when she represented that the same issues were not discussed in her 
meeting with Mr. Timothy. 
The Court could not find both Paul Timothy and Janice Timothy to be credible witnesses 
without somehow reconciling their testimony. Yet the Court determined by clear and convincing 
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evidence that Mr. Timothy's testimony established fraudulent representations. 
The foregoing should also be balanced against Mr. Timothy's statements that in the 
context of speaking with reasonable reliance he claims that he did not even know that a horse 
could be the subject of a lien and used as collateral. At deposition, Mr. Timothy testified as 
follows: 
Q: If I asked you what a purchase money security interest is, could you 
tell me? 
A: Wouldn't have a clue. 
Q: Do you have any idea how to create a security interest in a horse? 
A: Apparently not. 
[deposition of Paul Timothy, P. 10, L. 20-25] 
Yet when he discusses the issue in terms of whether a representation was made, he has 
the coincidental wherewithal to specifically ask Teri Keetch in the single meeting between him 
and Teri as well as the meeting with Thomas Keetch his wife and Becky Mendenliall"' if any of 
the animals she would put up for collateral was encumbered. I asked her if she had ever been 
under bankruptcy." T: page 423 lines 8 to 13. 
Either Mr. Timothy was truly unaware that a horse could be liened and used as collateral 
for a loan and therefore he would not have had the mind set to even ask the question; or in the 
alternative, Mr. Timothy was aware of the fact that there could be liens against a horse and that a 
horse could be used as collateral for a loan and so he might have asked the questions, but then 
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would have the corresponding obligation io conduct a reasonable and proper investigation which 
would have disclosed that in fact that such a lien existed. 
POINT IV 
IN THE EVENT THE COURT DETERMINES THAT COLLATERAL 
ESTOPPEL SHOULD APPLY, THEN THE COURT SHOULD FOREGO 
RENDERING AN OPINION UNTIL THE UTAH APPEAL PROCESS IS 
COMPLETE. 
This Court may conclude based upon the foregoing that the UCC filings with the Utah 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code provides constructive notice of the liens against 
the horse and that as a matter of law, the Timothys could not reasonably rely on the alleged 
representations and consequently there was no fraud. On the other hand the Court may conclude 
that collateral estoppel does apply and that the Utah proceedings are determinative. In the event 
that the Court determines that collateral estoppel does apply, then this Court should hold off 
making a final determination until all of the proceedings in the Utah Courts are complete. The 
Defendants have filed an appeal of the District Court's decision. It is appropriate if the Court 
applies a collateral estoppel standard, then the Bankruptcy Court should hold off making a final 
determination until the appeal is completed or else it may result in conflicting orders. 
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POINT V 
IN THE EVENT THAT THE COURT DETERMINES THAT 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY AND THAT THIS 
COURT MUST MAKE ITS OWN FACTUAL DETERMINATION THEN 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FAILS IN THAT 
THERE ARE CLEARLY ISSUES OF FACT WHICH CANNOT BE 
DETERMINED IN FAVOR OF THE TIMOTHYS WHICH PRECLUDES 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In the alternative, if the Court determines collateral estoppel does not apply, then this 
Court must make its own legal and factual determination. In the meeting between Paul Timothy 
and Teri Kcetch, Teri represented that the issue of whether Hesa Son of a Dun had any liens or 
used as collateral on existing loans never took place. Mr. Timothy claims otherwise. At the only 
other meeting between the Keetches and the Timothys which occurred in the presence of Tom 
Keetch at the closing, Tom Keetch, Becky Mendenhall and Janice Timothy all testified that the 
issue of liens on Hesa Son of a Dim or whether he had been used as collateral never was 
discussed, yet Mr. Timothy claims that it did. Defendants believe that the issue can be resolved 
as a matter of law in that the Timothys could not reasonably rely on said representation because 
of the constructive notice given to them by the UCC filings. If the courts disagrees with the 
constructive notice argument then the matter cannot be resolved on summary judgment because 
23 
of the factual dispute. Alternatively, this Court could either review the testimony given at Trial 
in the Utah District Court and reach its own conclusions based upon the testimony and the record 
or in the alternative would need to conduct its own evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this^Xl day of Ocfofa&U-2009. 
TERIKEETCH 
TtTOMAS KEETCH 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^V) day of jQ^^M|r2009 ) I mailing a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to the following: 
M. Kent Mecham, Esq. 
Mecham & Associates, Chartered 
7830 North 23rd Avenue 
Phoenix, AZ 85021 ^ ' / / 
, # c ti*ki [ 
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Dated: December 24,2009 
State Bar No. 005738 
M. KENT MECHAM 
MECHAM & ASSOCIATES, CHARTERJD_ 
7830 North 23ld Avenue 
Phoenix, AZ 85021 
(€02) 246-7626 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Svv /^i^ u^vCY-4-u 
EYT SARAH S. CURLEYf
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 
In Re: 
THOMAS R. KEETCH and 
TERIL. KEETCH, 
Debtors. 
PAUL A. TIMOTHY and JANICE 
TIMOTHY, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THOMAS R. KEETCH and 
TERI L. KEETCH, 
Defendants. 
NO. 2:07-bk-02532-SSC 
(Chapter 7} 
Adv. No.2:07~ap-00509-SSC 
JUDGMENT 
This matter having come on for hearing on Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Plaintiffs appearing by and through their attorney, M. 
KENT MECHAM; Defendant, Teri L. Keetch, appearing telephonically; 
The court having considered the Motion, with its 
86304032221018 
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accompanying documents, the Response to the Motion with 
accompanying documents; and the Reply to the Response with 
accompanying documents, and the oral argument of the parties; 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the debt owing 
to the Plaintiffs' Paul A. Timothy and Janis Timothy, husband 
wife, by the Defendants Thomas R. Keetch and Teri L. Keetch, is a 
non-dischargeable debt pursuant to 11 USC §523(a) (2) (A); and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED granting 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants as 
follows: 
1. Principal of $75,451.17; 
2. Interest as of January 13, 2009 of $12,738.82 with 
interest continuing to accrue thereon from January 13, 2009 at the 
rate of 7.49% per annum until paid in full; 
3. Costs of collection of $1,600.00; 
4. Post-judgment interest from 6 May 2009 at the rate 
of 2.4% on all interest owed and costs of suit owed; 
23 jj 5. Attorney's fees of $62,915.76, with interest on the 
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27 || 6. This judgment shall be augmented in the amount of 
28 
attorney's fees at the rate of 2.4% per annum from 20 July 2009; 
and 
X/S^nin7P?pini « 
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reasonable attorney's fees and costs expended collecting said 
judgment by execution or otherwise. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this day of December, 2009. 
JUDGE 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
86304032221027 
Exhibit "G" 
05SouthgoOEast,SUiteMO ^ 
ilt Lake;City, UtafiMli7¥203 I I 
D1) 270-9090 -y «& ^ * v ' ^ 
3y Eighty Three T h o u s a k i g | | | ^ ^ 
K20015154 
rfhe'order of Pa ul;M ^ Timothy and Janice Davidson Timdjg j f ' ^ J 
j " ^ -'. • • : • --rpj.. 
the order of Paul M. Timothy and Janice Davidson Timothy 
: 20015154 
3r: Paul M. Timothy; Janice D. Timothy 
5f : 
'ow Officer: CAMILLE GOTFREDSON 
3l Description: 
•erty Address : 2735 North 900 West Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
) Proceeds 
1-20395 
9/27/2001 
$****83,190.95 
the order of Paul M. Timothy and Janice Davidson Timothy 
20015154 
r: Paul M. Timothy; Janice D. Timothy 
r: 
DW Officer: CAMILLE GOTFREDSON 
I Description i 
3rty Address ; 2735 North 900 West Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
Proceeds 
1-20395. 
9/27/2001 
$****83,190.95 
g* PLAINTIFF'S 
: EXHIBIT NO. _ 
! FOR IDENTIFICATION 
± 
I DATE: RPTR: 
Exhibit "H" 
JANJCE DAVIDSON1 . _ 
PAUL M T I M O T H Y / - ^ 
2735 N 800 W 801 785&fe*( 
PLEASANT GROVE, LTTH B^L. 
XtflWKlOII 
I : I 2 I * 3 D I D 3 J : 0 
PLAINTIFF'S 
! EXHIBIT NO . 
! FOR IDENTIFICATION 
5 iDATE RPTR 
DO NOT VvTrltTE. STAMP OH SIGN BELOW THIS LINE 
RESERVED FOR FINANCIAL inSTITUTlOH USE * 
*-FEDERAL HESERVE BOAFiO OF GOVERNORS REG. CC 
